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"AIN'T I A PARENT?":' THE EXCLUSION OF KINSHIP
CAREGIVERS FROM THE DEBATE OVER EXPANSIONS OF
PARENTHOOD
SACHA M. COUPET
ABSTRACT
Kinship caregivers-a group disproportionately populated by persons
of color, particularly black grandmothers -have historically assumed
parental roles, often together with a legal parent. Yet even as kin have
increasingly assumed substantial parental responsibilities over the past few
decades, they continue to have limited opportunities to carry the title of
legal parent. At the same time, in claims involving stepfamilies and samesex partners of parents, and cases involving assisted reproductive
technology (ART), family courts have expanded their definition of
parenthood to recognize the rights of other caregivers, including those
whose parental claims extend beyond the so-called "rule of two."2 The
common element that these groups share is a conjugal tie with the legal
parent. The differential treatment of kinship caregivers demonstrates that
the concept of parenthood remains inextricably intertwined with the
1. The title references Soujourner Truth's "Ain't I a Woman?" speech, which she gave
extemporaneously at a woman's rights convention in Akron, Ohio in 1851. Sojourner
at
available
1851),
(Dec.
Woman
a
I
Ain't
Truth,
In this speech, Truth
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/sojtruth-woman.html.
challenged the exclusion of black women's voices, experiences and viewpoints from the
women's suffrage movement. Id. Truth argued that the women's movement of her time
needed to be inclusive of black women, who, until then, were largely invisible and ignored.
Id. The reference to Truth in the title of this article is meant to illustrate how the discourse
on expansions to parenthood may be similarly exclusionary.
Associate Professor of Law and Director of Research Civitas ChildLaw Center,
Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Many thanks to Margaret Moses, Diane
Geraghty, Lee Clark, and Kenneth Nunn for their insightful comments. I would also like to
thank all of the participants at the Midwest Family Law Conference at the Indiana
University School of Law-Indianapolis, the Faculty Enrichment Speaker Series at the
Florida A&M University College of Law, and the University of Pittsburgh School of Law
faculty colloquia for their very helpful suggestions and critique. Finally, I extend my
gratitude to the editors of the New York University Review of Law and Social Change for
their significant editorial assistance. All errors, of course, are my own.
2. The "rule of two," a phrase coined by Elizabeth Marquardt, relates to the
dimension of exclusivity within parenthood, typically limiting parentage to two individuals
at one time, historically one mother and one father. See Elizabeth Marquardt, Op-Ed.,
When 3Reallyis a Crowd, N.Y. Times, July 16, 2007, at A13 (referencing "the rule of two"
in an editorial cautioning against expanding legal parenthood beyond two adults), available
athttp://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/16/ opinion/16marquardt.html.
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concept of conjugality -whether through legal marriage, quasi-marriage,
or the mere capacity to marry or engage in prescribed mating. By
privileging conjugal ties, the current framing of the parenthood debate
excludes nonconjugal actors, most notably relative or kinship caregivers,
from consideration as legal co-parents and from the accompanying
discourse around multiple parentage. This article explores parental claims
both within and outside of the scope of conjugality. In doing so, it reveals
that, while the discourse on expanded notions of parenthood remains
marriage-centered, the underlying rationales for extending parental
assignment within conjugal relationships apply with equal force to
nonconjugal kinship caregiving. Ultimately, it aims to enlarge the space
within the community of "legitimate" parents to include kinship
caregivers.
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In her 1974 account of kinship networks in a poor black
community, the anthropologist Carol B. Stack outlined the
complex informal rules governing intergenerational rights
over, and responsibilities to, children. "This system of rights
and duties should not be confused with the official, written
statutory law of the state. . ." she cautioned. "Community

members clearly operate within two different systems: the
folk system and the legal system of the courts and welfare
offices." What is wounding when the legal system fails to
recognize the folk system is not just the denial of muchneeded support but the message [these kinship caregiving]
families are somehow illegitimate.'
I.
INTRODUCTION
Family law scholars suggest that "[tloday's families are characterized
by increased fluidity, a loosening of the state's hold on family life, and the
delegation of caregiving tasks to individuals and institutions outside the
formal, legal family."4 Although far from a recent phenomenon, an
increasing number of children are currently being "parented" in the homes
of relatives by nonparent caregivers, predominantly grandparents,' often
alongside and cooperatively with a legal parent. These caregivers are
disproportionately persons of color, particularly black men and women.'
3. NELL BERNSTEIN, ALL ALONE IN THE WORLD: CHILDREN OF THE INCARCERATED
136 (2005) (emphasis added).
4. Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting,24 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 47,47 (2007).
5. See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NATIONAL SURVEY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT WELL-BEING, RESEARCH BRIEF No. 15:
KINSHIP CAREGIVERS IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 1 (2010) (noting that "the
increasingly favorable view of kin as foster parents ha[s] contributed to the rise in kin as
primary caregivers"), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/oprelabuse-neglect/
nscaw/reports/kinship-caregivers/rb_15_2col.pdf; Judy Fortin, Grandparents Take on
Parenthood,Again, CNN.COM, Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/family/09
/08/hm.grandparents.caregivers/index.html (noting that "2.5 million grandparents around
the United States who are the primary caregivers for their grandchildren").
6. ALLEN W. HARDEN, REBECCA L. CLARK & KAREN MAGUIRE, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH

& HUMAN

SERVS., FORMAL AND INFORMAL KINSHIP CARE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Yet family law itself is not keeping pace with this shifting familial
caregiving landscape. While courts increasingly recognize the legitimate
parental roles of stepparents, the same-sex partners of parents, and
involved donors who helped conceive the child through assisted
reproductive technology (ART), courts regard kinship caregivers as
possessing illegitimate claims to parental status.7 Courts' treatment of
kinship caregivers as having inferior third-party or nonparent claims fails
to reflect both the critical role that their parenting efforts play in the lives
of the children they are rearing and, more importantly, the relationship
that develops between them and those children. The only salient
distinction between kinship caregivers and other nontraditional parents is
(1997) ("African American children are most likely to live in kinship care settings, at levels
four to five times as great as those for white non-Hispanic children."), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/ HSP/cyp/xskincar.htm. Kinship caregiving remains disproportionately
high among minority families, particularly African-Americans. See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN
& FAMILIES, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON KINSHIP
FOSTER CARE: ExECUTIVE SUMMARY (2000) (noting that children in public kinship care
available
at
to
be
African-American),
more
likely
are
much
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/kinr2c00/; ROB GEEN, URBAN INSTITUE, KINSHIP CARE: MAKING
THE MOST OF A VALUABLE RESOURCE (2002) (citing research studies demonstrating that
children in kinship foster care are far more likely to be black than children in non-kin foster

care), available at http://www.urban.org/pubs/KinshipCare/chapterl.html (last visited Sept.
6, 2010); U.S. Frances H. Foster, The FamilyParadigmof InheritanceLaw, 80 N.C. L. REV.
199, 245-46 (2001) ("In the past decade alone, ethnic minority communities have witnessed
an extraordinary increase in so-called 'kinship caregiving' to the point that hundreds of
thousands of American children are now raised by extended family members and
nonrelatives rather than their 'legal' parent.").
7. One example of this differential treatment is the different fora in which these
different claims to parenthood are typically raised. More often than not, kinship claims are
relegated to the public arena of child welfare, whereas those of other nonparents-such as
stepparent, same-sex partners, and parents through ART-are typically addressed in the
private context of domestic relations court, the only court actually capable of conferring
parental status. This differential treatment is a function of both statutory law and general
practice, as observed by myself and many who practice in child welfare. Kinship caregivers
have limited standing to raise claims in private domestic relations matters and are far more
likely to be in either probate court seeking guardianship of the minors in their care or in
dependency court in some form of a child welfare proceeding. Compare, for example, the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(b)(3) (2010),
which provides standing for stepparents even when a custodial parent is living but "unable
to perform the duties of a parent," with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(b)(4) (2010), which
provides standing for grandparents only when one of the parents is deceased. Another
example of differential treatment is evident in the manner in which courts distinguish
between the parental claims of romantically linked "partners" versus relatives who are not
romantically linked to a biological parent. CompareIn re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 400 (N.Y.
1995) (upholding principle that homosexual partners of biological parents had standing to
petition for adoption of their partner's children) with In re Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d 731, 73233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (holding, twelve years later, that a maternal uncle who wished to
co-parent his nephew alongside his sister, the biological mother did not have standing to
adopt). In In re Garret,for example, the court reasoned that expansions to standing
provisions in adoption law "have been predicated on the rationale that the relationship
between the proposed adoptive parents is the functional equivalent of the traditional
husband-wife relationship," a rationale that clearly excludes relatives. 841 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
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that the latter group of adults is connected to the child via a conjugal or
quasi-conjugal tie to one parent, even if only for the purposes of prescribed
mating or heterosexual reproduction, while kinship caregivers are not.
Since their claims arise outside of conjugality, kinship caregivers occupy
the fringes of the marriage-centered discourse on expanded conceptions of
parentage and parenthood.
I begin with two hypotheticals drawn from actual cases to illustrate the
law's normative model of dual, conjugal, and exclusive parenthood. The
following hypotheticals challenge the assumption that the law cannot and
should not recognize two legal mothers, or even three or more legal
parents, among whom rights and responsibilities are divided in a manner
reflective of the ways in which ongoing care is delivered and significant
relationships are formed. Moreover, they reveal the limited capacity of a
biological and marriage-centered model to adequately capture the varied
cultural and social functions of parenting. Such a reexamination of the
dual, conjugal, and exclusive model may result in the attribution of
parental status-with all the attendant legal rights and obligations-to

more than two adults, and to ancestor/descendant-related adults for whom
marital ties are impermissible.
Hypothetical#1

When her daughter, Amanda, is just two years old, Carla, twenty-two,
is sentenced to ten years in prison with the possibility of early parole.
Although Amanda's father's parental rights have not been terminated, he
provides little financial or instrumental support to his daughter and has
only sporadic contact with her. Prior to Carla's incarceration, she consents
to a guardianship under which Amanda is left in the care of a first cousin,
Pam, with whom Carla and Amanda have been quite close. The
guardianship grants fairly broad powers, including the authority to seek
medical treatment and to enroll Amanda in school. Carla's residual
parental rights include the right to consent to Amanda's adoption and the
right to visitation with her. Amanda maintains a close relationship with
Carla through twice-monthly visitation at the prison, which is equipped
with a visiting facility that encourages a great deal of one-on-one time
between incarcerated parents and their young children. Over the next four
years, Carla and Pam occasionally clash over decisions concerning the
child, most notably about the timing and frequency of visits. In each
instance in which their wishes for the child differ, Carla trumps Pam by
virtue of her superior parental rights and her veiled threat of petitioning to
appoint an alternate guardian. Under governing state dependency law,
there is no legal basis for the termination of Carla's parental rights, as she
has neither harmed nor neglected her child, and has instead made
arrangements for Amanda's care by a responsible relative-Pam. The law
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recognizes the primacy of Carla's fundamental right to care, custody, and
control of her child, even as it allows the guardian to act as the de facto
parent. After four years of consistent caregiving, Pam desires to have the
relationship with Amanda made permanent and legally secure, particularly
against Carla's threats to remove Amanda from Pam's care. Pam does not,
however, wish to have Carla excluded from Amanda's life permanently,
and would prefer to assume a co-parenting role with Carla upon her
release from prison in the next few years. According to Pam, "No matter
what, Carla is Amanda's parent ... and so am I."
This hypothetical raises significant concerns about the ways in which
the legal system can or will give legitimacy to the folk system of caregiving.
For example, what are the benefits of vesting a maternal cousin with
parental rights that would place her on equal footing with Carla,
essentially creating two legal mothers not joined by a conjugal or quasiconjugal bond?' How might the answer differ if the parties were a
biological mother and biological father instead of first cousins? A
biological mother and the child's stepfather? A biological mother and her
same-sex partner? In addition, how might the answer differ if, within this
family, there was an established pattern of relative caregiving over several
generations?
Hypothetical#2

Tina, now twenty-six, gave birth to Shawn, now ten, while she resided
with her parents, the maternal grandparents (hereinafter MGPs). Tina's
substance use was and remains a frequent source of conflict between Tina
and her parents. Tina is an infrequent presence in her son's life, leaving
him largely in the care of his MGPs. However, there is no formal
agreement regarding Shawn's care that grants MGPs legal authority vis-ivis their grandson beyond a limited power of attorney. Shawn's father,
who lives near the MGPs, is also only intermittently involved with his son,
visiting him at the MGPs' home on average once a month and providing
only meager financial support. During the occasional periods in which
Tina is present in the MGPs' home, she assumes an appropriate parenting
role and has developed a mutually loving relationship with her son, who
refers to her as "mom." From birth, however, the MGPs have played the
most active role in parenting Shawn. He refers to them as "mama and
papa." Like many grandparents in this circumstance, the MGPs continue
to hold out hope that their daughter Tina will eventually become a
responsible mother to her child. They are thus reluctant to initiate any
effort to terminate their daughter's parental rights. They are also
8. This hypothetical question assumes that the legal father also retains his parental
rights, thus creating the possibility of three legal parents.
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particularly leery of state involvement in their family's life. As such, they
refuse to contact child protective services to seek Shawn's entry into the
child welfare system or to petition to be appointed as his legal guardians.
Instead, they choose to address the situation privately, remaining vigilant
when Tina returns to their home out of fear that one day she may leave the
house with Shawn and never return. Although there are at times points of
contention among the four adults who function in some parental capacity
towards Shawn,9 they regard themselves as successfully co-parenting this
child.
Under such shared parenting circumstances, what room is there for the
recognition of grandparents' parental claims coextensive with those of the
legal parents, essentially creating four legal parents with minimal or no
conjugal ties? How does, or should, the law divide the rights and
responsibilities of parenthood in a manner reflective of the ways in which
ongoing care is delivered and significant relationships are formed,
particularly within a cultural milieu in which expanded caregiving and
shared parenting is the norm?
As these hypotheticals illustrate, our current conjugality-based
conceptualization of parenthood often excludes third-party, nonparent
caregivers who are equally deserving of legal parental status. The aim of
this article is not to offer a prescriptive solution to this problem, nor to
provide a detailed roadmap regarding the precise legal mechanisms by
which kinship caregivers may assume parental status. Rather, my more
limited goal is to elucidate the discourse on parenthood in order to expose
the ways in which a marriage focus excludes a class of parental candidates.
In so doing, this article aims to accommodate vertical conceptions of
multiple parentage within kinship networks. I believe this more inclusive
discourse creates a space for functional families in the wider community of
legitimate families -a space that more accurately reflects the social norms
and needs of kinship caregiving families.
Part II explores kinship caregiving as a growing phenomenon in the
U.S., focusing especially on its historical and cultural significance within
communities of color, particularly black families." In Part III, I examine
9. This hypothetical assumes that the legal father, although minimally involved,
maintains some parental role and, hence, his parental rights. The other three legal parents,
again, are the MGPs and Tina.
10. I use the term "vertical" and "horizontal" to reference how the family structure
would be depicted within a family tree. A mother or father's spouse, quasi-spouse, or
prescribed mating partner would be connected to her/him along a horizontal axis,
referencing the creation of a new generation of a larger family. Throughout the article,
these kinds of relationships are termed "horizontal." By contrast, a mother or father's
ancestors (parents, aunts, uncles, etc.) would be aligned vertically above her or him. For
the purposes of this article, the intergenerational relationships, including those to same-age,
extended family members are termed "vertical."
11. I use the term "black" in this article, rather than "African-American" to refer
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the core dimensions of parenthood that frame the legal parent-child
relationship as exclusive, dyadic, and horizontal,or marriage-centered.12
Part IV describes the circumstances under which exceptions to the
traditional parentage norms are made and the compelling justifications for
these departures from the norm, principally as they arise within
stepfamilies, same-sex couples as parents, and individuals utilizing ART.
Part V argues that the rationales underlying courts' extension of legal
rights to nontraditional parents should apply in equal measure to kinship
caregiving families, and that courts should apply an emic rather than an
etic perspective when dealing with these claims." Part VI examines the
quasi-parental designations and equitable remedies available to kinship
caregivers and suggests the application of a novel conception of "kinship
adoption," as well as presumptions of parenthood, for relatives as parents.
II.
KINSHIP CAREGIVING
The experiences of adults raising minor relatives, formally termed
kinship caregivers, reveal the limits of the current marriage-centered
definition of parenthood. Far from a recent phenomenon, the practice of
kinship care has roots in ancient and traditional societies throughout the
world.14 Kinship caregiving encompasses a range of family arrangements,
from adult relatives who have sole responsibility for rearing a child to
relatives who share childrearing responsibilities with the child's parent(s).
These kinship caregiving relationships may be public and formal -as when
inclusively both to African-Americans and to other descendants of the African diaspora.
12. In so arguing, I do not challenge the superiority of parental claims. By focusing
narrowly on the specific aspects of number ("rule of two") and kind (conjugal over
nonconjugal) of adults who can successfully claim parental rights, this article seeks to
expand the pool of eligible parents in whom this superior right is vested. In doing so, this
article picks up Janet Richard's proposal that "if a third party has functioned as a parent
toward the child, that third party would also enjoy the protection of the natural parent
preference and the standard for determining custody as between the 'third party parent'
and the natural parent would be the best interest of the child." Janet Leach Richards, The
Natural Parent Preference Versus Third Parties:Expanding the Definition of Parent, 16

L. REv. 733, 735 (1992). It also explores how an attachment to conjugality impedes
implementation of this recommendation.
13. I use the term "emic" to describe the viewpoint of members of the cultural group
in question and "etic" to describe a wider, outside perspective. See Elaine Chui, The
CulturalDifferential in ParentalAutonomy, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1773, 1821-22 (2008)
(positing that emic perspective "allows for a more holistic view" of particular phenomenon
from within, rather than outside of, cultural context) (internal citations and quotation
omitted).
14. Rebecca L. Hegar, The CulturalRoots of Kinship Care, in KINSHIP FOSTER CARE:
POLICY, PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 17, 18-19 (Rebecca L. Hegar & Maria Scannapieco eds.,
1999) (noting that "[t]he rearing of another's child is among the oldest literary themes,"
reflecting an ancient tradition of alternate care woven into the mythology and norms of
many different cultures).
NOVA

HeinOnline -- 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 602 2010

2010]

AIN'TIA PARENT?

603

relatives provide care within the foster care system-or private and
informal. In recent years, more and more children are raised by both
formal and informal kinship caregivers. Given the rich cultural history of
shared parenting within extended families and the long-standing traditions
of "othermothering" or "childkeeping" within the black community, the
case for attribution of parental status in black kinship caregiving families is
particularly strong.
A. FactsandFigures

Over the past few decades, kinship caregiving has become significantly
more common in the United States. Between 1990 and 2000, the number
of children under the age of eighteen living in grandparent-headed
households increased by thirty percent." In 2000, more than six million
children across the country -approximately one in twelve-lived in homes

maintained by grandparents or other relatives.'6 Forty-one percent of all
children residing with a grandparent are being raised primarily by that
grandparent.17 This figure rose sharply in the past few years, increasing six
percent between 2007 and 2008 alone.18 Translated into real numbers, 2.9
million children were being raised primarily by their grandparent in 2008.19
Slightly less than half of the children being parented primarily by
grandparents -forty-nine percent-also reside with one of their biological

parents. 20 Rates of participation in kinship caregiving appear to be higher
in urban areas, including New York City, Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles,
and Philadelphia.21 In Washington, D.C., for example, 14.5 percent of all
children live in grandparent-headed households, with another 4.7 percent
in households headed by other relatives. 22 While a small minority of
15. AMER. Assoc. OF RETIRED PERSONS, LEAN ON ME: SUPPORT AND MINORITY
OUTREACH FOR GRANDPARENTS RAISING GRANDCHILDREN 2 (2003), available at

http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ general/gp_2003_a.pdf.
16. DONNA M. BUTTS, THE ANNA E. CASEY FOUND., KINSHIP CARE: SUPPORTING
at
(2005),
available
CHILDREN
4
RAISE
OUR
WHO
http://www.aecorg/upload/PublicationFiles/ Kincare.pdf.
17. GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON & KIM PARKER, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SINCE THE START
OF THE GREAT RECESSION, MORE CHILDREN RAISED BY GRANDPARENTS 1 (2010),
available athttp://pewsocialtrends.org/assets/pdf/764-children-raised-by-grandparents.pdf
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. LIVINGSTON & PARKER, supra note 17, at 2.
21. According to 2000 U.S. Census data, over a quarter of a million grandparents serve
as kinship caregivers in just the ten largest U.S. cities. Detroit, Chicago, and Los Angeles
have a combined total of approximately 89,000 grandparent caregiving families. New York
City alone has a total of almost 84,000. TAVIA SIMMONS & JAN LAWLER DYE, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, GRANDPARENTS LIVING WITH GRANDCHILDREN: 2000 7 tbl.3 (2003), available at
www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-31.pdf.
22. GRANDFACTS, A STATE FACT SHEET FOR GRANDPARENTS AND OTHER RELATIVES
available at
1
(2007),
COLUMBIA
OF
DISTRICT
CHILDREN:
RAISING
THOSE
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children residing with relatives-roughly 131,000-are in "formal" or
"public" kinship placements within the foster care system,2
the
overwhelming majority reside in what are termed "informal" or "private"
kinship arrangements. 4
This aggregate kinship data above may not capture those caregiving
settings in which a biological parent stays intermittently in the home of the
grandparent caregiver, which anecdotal evidence suggests occurs with
some frequency." Data from the 2008 American Community Survey
suggest that some sort of shared parenting may be taking place in most
kinship households. According to the Survey, a parent also resides in the
home with 1.6 million of the 2.6 million children being raised by
grandparents. 26 It can be reasonably inferred from the data that in at least
some of these households, grandparents may share parental roles and
responsibilities with a legal parent in what is effectively a co-parenting
relationship. 27
While these numbers highlight the importance of parenting issues and
laws regarding kinship givers, particularly grandparent caregivers, the
following section explains the roots of the kinship caregiving family and
the real life issues that parenting laws must take into account. These issues
include, for example, whether kinship caregiving families should be
compared to the predominate dyadic parenting norm and how departures
from this norm cut against claims to parental status.
www.grandfactsheets.org/ doc/DC%20%2007.pdf.
23. The approximately 131,000 foster children in kinship care make up more than onethird of the entire foster care population of 391,253 children. Burrrs, supranote 16, at 4.
24. For more on the distinction between formal and informal kinship arrangements,
see infra Part II(C).
25. Since 1996, I have worked as a researcher and advocate for grandparents raising
grandchildren in predominately urban communities, including Detroit, Philadelphia, and
Chicago, interviewing and participating in service delivery for this community. In my work
with grandparent caregivers, I have learned of many instances of effective co-parenting,
particularly in informal kinship caregiving families where a biological parent resides, either
intermittently or on a long-term basis, with a grandparent caregiver. Although they are not
technically legal parents, these grandparent caregivers assume primary child-rearing
responsibilities with the consent of biological legal parents.
26. U.S. Census Bureau, American Factfinder, B10002, Grandchildren Under 18 Years
Living with a Grandparent Householder, available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/
DTTable?_bm=y&-geojid=01000US&ds-name=ACS_2008_3YR_GOO_&-_lang=en&-redo
Log=true&-mtname=ACS_2008_3YRG2000_B10001&-mtname=ACS_2008_3YRG20
00_B10002&-format=&-CONTEXT=dt.
27. Studies of kinship caregiving households have shown that grandparent caregivers
raising children in private or informal care often share parental roles and responsibilities
with a legal parent, as opposed to the caregiver wholly supplanting the legal parent.
Catherine Chase Goodman, Marilyn Potts, Eileen Mayers Pasztor & Dolores Scorzo,
Grandmothers as Kinship Caregivers: Private Arrangements Compared to Pubbc Child
Welfare Oversight, 26 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REv. 287, 299 (2004) ("[G]randmothers
providing care privately were more likely to collaborate with parents in decisions about the
child and had typically provided care for a longer time.").
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B. The Causes and Culture of Kinship Care

"The rearing of another's child is among the oldest literary themes,"
reflecting an ancient tradition of alternate care woven into the mythology
and norms of many different cultures.2 While kinship caregiving is
practiced in many communities within the U.S., it is disproportionately
prevalent in communities of color, especially among black families. 29
Census data confirm that, among co-resident grandparents, black
grandparents are more likely than even Latino or white grandparents to be
responsible for their grandchildren. 0
The traditional nuclear family model, espoused as the AngloAmerican ideal during industrialization, has never been a tradition among
black families.3 1 Instead, these families reflect "a complex web of factors
including individual personalities and choices, as well as remnants of
African culture and patterns of survival dating from the period of
enslavement."3 2 In particular, kinship caregiving among black families,
including a sense of corporate shared responsibility for children, has
historical roots in slavery and the cultural traditions brought by slaves to
the United States.33
Black families have retained from these roots distinctive caregiving
patterns that are strongly reflective of the concept of vertical parentage or
shared parenting across generations. 34 Black mothers often accept
nonconjugal co-parenting relationships as a solid parenting framework for
28. Hegar, supranote 14, at 18.
29. SIMMONS & DYE, supra note 21, at 2 (noting that considerably higher rates of
kinship care are found among nonwhite families).
30. See id at 3, tbl.1.
31. Twila L. Perry, Race Matters: Change, Choice, and Family Law at the Millenium,
33 FAM. L.Q. 461, 474 (1999) [hereinafter Perry, Race Matters].
3 2. Id.
33. John W. Ellis, Yours, Mine, Ours?- Why the Texas Legislature Should Simplify
CaretakerConsent Capabilitiesfor Minor Children and the Implicationsof the Addition of
Chapter 34 to the Texas Family Code, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 987, 996 (2010) ("AfricanAmericans have relied heavily on kinship care for centuries due to influences of African
collectivist cultural underpinnings and the impact of slavery on African-American
families."); Sonia Gipson Rankin, Why They Won't Take the Money: Black Grandparents
and the Success of InformalKinship Care, 10 ELDER L.J. 153, 157-59 (2002) (noting that
"[t]he Black American kinship care system developed its roots in pre-slavery Africa" and
continued both during slavery and following emancipation). Cf Hegar, supra note 14, at 20
(noting that "in West Africa [from where most slaves brought to America originate],
fostering is rooted in kinship structures and affiliations and unlike its 'Western'
connotations, the term is not necessarily perceived to be associated with families that are in
some way disjointed or dysfunctional" (internal citations omitted)).
34. Hegar, supra note 14, at 20. CL Shirley Hill, Class,Race, and GenderDimensions
of Child Rearingin Afican Ameican Fanlies,31 J. BLACK STUDIES 494, 495-508 (2001)
("[A]lthough Black parents have embraced most of the values of the dominant society,
their American experiences and African heritage have led to some distinctive socialization
patterns, most of which revolve around race, class, and gender.").
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raising children.35 Blacks are also more likely than whites to rely on
relatives and fictive kin for practical support, such as help with
transportation, housework, and child care.16 Indeed, the role of extended
family, particularly grandmothers, in providing support for black families is
well-documented.37 According to one study, "[b]oth co-residential and
extra-residential domestic alliances are typical" among black mothers and
grandmothers. 38 Similarly, the practice of "othermothering," common in
the black community, presents a model of shared parenting incongruous
with the norm of the exclusive nuclear family.39 Othermothers, who can
include blood relatives such as sisters, aunts or grandmothers, as well as
close friends and fictive kin, are women who assist biological mothers by
sharing mothering responsibilities for short or long periods in both
informal and formal arrangements.40 Many black mothers look for and
receive assistance with childcare and domestic support from their mothers
in lieu of their marriage partners or the father of their child for a number
of reasons, including: limited economic opportunities for women in the
childbearing generation; the dearth of economically-secure marriage
candidates; and the burdens associated with births outside of marriage. 41
Kinship caregiving practices are thus part of a range of strategies
employed by black families coping with economic, social, and political
pressures, "including child fosterage, shared living arrangements, and
flexible parenting roles." 42 In doing so, these families develop dynamics of
closeness, communication, and adaptability- all of which, family systems
theorists believe, improve the well-being of all family members. 43 This rich
35. See Robin L. Jarrett, African American Mothers and Grandmothersin Poverty:

An AdaptationalPerspective, 20 J. CoMP. FAM. STUD. 387, 388 (1998) (noting that poor
African-American families often rely on "child fosterage, shared living arrangements, and
flexible parenting roles").
36. Kessler, supra note 4, at 57.
37. S. Yvette Murphy, Andrea G. Hunter & Deborah J. Johnson, Transforming
Caregiving: African-American Custodial Grandmothers and the Child Welfare System, J.

Soc. & Soc. WELFARE, June 2008, at 68 (internal citations omitted).
38. Jarrett, supra note 35, at 394 (1998). See also CAROL STACK, ALL OUR KIN 70
(1974) ("Field observations of 139 dependent children who are assigned to a grantee other
than their mother [typically a maternal grandmother] revealed that practically one-half of
those children's mothers generally resided in the same dwelling as their child.").
39. Kessler, supranote 4, at 57.
40. Stanlie M. James, Mothering: A Possible Black Feminist Link to Social
Transformation," in THEORIZING BLACK FEMINISMS: THE VISIONARY PRAGMATISM OF
BLACK WOMEN 45 (Stanlie M. James & Abena P.A. Busia, eds., 1993). See also Priscilla A.
Gibson, African American Grandmothersas Caregivers: Answering the Call to Help their

Grandchildren,FAM. IN Soc., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 35 ("African American grandmothers
continue to follow [a] tradition of mothering in the role of othermother andgrandmother.")
(emphasis mine).
41. Jarrett, supra note 35, at 389-394.
42. Id at 388 (citations omitted).
43. CL Monique Y. Johnson-Gamer & Steven A. Meyers, What FactorsContribute to
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system of interdependence has helped many black families to successfully
manage a range of significant life stressors, including poverty and
discrimination. 44 This successful and adaptive interdependence is not
necessarily reflective of a marital or quasi-marital norm, a feature that
frustrates kinship caregivers' attempts to attain protected parental status.
Several factors may cause nonparent adults to become the primary
caregiver for a relative's child. In some cases, kinship caregiving
arrangements may develop where the legal parent(s): has a substance
abuse problem; has abused, neglected, or abandoned the child; or is
incarcerated. 45 These issues are particularly prevalent among children
within the formal foster care system. As private or informal kinship
caregiving families are not attached to any comprehensive service system
or a central database tracking their particular needs, researchers are only
beginning to learn why families choose to adopt informal or private
kinship caregiving arrangements without state intervention.4
At the same time, states increasingly rely on kinship foster care
placements for children within the formal foster care system due to both
fiscal constraints and improved outcomes for children. Data from the
National Survey of Child and Adolescent Well-Being reveal that children
in kinship foster care demonstrate better outcomes on physical, cognitive,
and skills-based domains than children in nonkinship foster care.47
Children in kinship foster care also have more positive perceptions of their
placements: they are more likely to report that they like who they live
with, that they want their current placement to be their permanent home,
and that they "always felt loved."# They are less likely to report having
tried to leave or run away.49 Furthermore, "both teachers and caregivers
tend to rate children living with kinship foster parents as having fewer
the Resilience of African-American Children Within Kinship Care?, 32 CHILD & YOUTH
CARE FORUM 255, 256-57 (2003).
44. Rankin, supranote 33, at 156-159.
45. REGAN MAIN, JENNIFER EHRLE MACOMBER & ROB GEEN, THE URBAN INST.,
TRENDS IN SERVICE RECEIPT: CHILDREN IN KINSHIP CARE GAINING GROUND 1 (2006),
available at www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311310_B-68.pdf; Rob Geen, The Evolution of
Kinsh Care Policy and Practice, 14 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 131, 134 (2004), available at
http:// www.futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/14_01-07.pdf
46. Goodman, Potts, Pasztor & Scorzo, supra note 27, at 288. Research indicates that
private kinship caregiving saves taxpayers billions over other out-of-home caregiving
options paid for by the federal and state government. Conservative estimates suggest that
if even half of the two million children being raised informally or privately by relatives
without parents in the home were to enter the foster care system, it would cost taxpayers
$6.5 billion a year. Burrs, supra note 16, at 4. These numbers would undoubtedly
overwhelm a system which is already significantly overburdened and underresourced.
47. TIFFANY CONWAY & RUTLEDGE Q. HUTSON, CTR. FOR L. & Soc. POL'Y, Is KINSHIP
CARE GOOD FOR KIDS? 2 (2007), available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications
/files/ 0347.pdf.
48. Id.at 1.
49. Id.
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behavioral problems than do their peers in other out-of-home placement
settings.""
While there is limited research capturing the direct
perspectives of children in kinship caregiving families, the research that
does exist suggests that children perceive a greater degree of love, safety,
and permanence in kinship caregiving arrangements when compared with
those living with non-kin."
C NegotiatingStatus within Kinshio CaregivingFamilies
Despite the important role they play in raising children, kinship
caregivers face numerous challenges in assuming parental roles, including
depleted resources, minimal instrumental support, and typical caregiver
stress and burden. One of the most vexing hurdles they face is the
ambiguous, often tenuous, legal status that many kinship caregivers have
vis a vis the children they are raising.
The ambiguity of the caregiver's legal status represents one of the
sharpest distinctions between formal/public and informal/private kinship
care. Formal kinship caregivers have the clearest role, as they are
designated foster parents by the state and have unambiguous authority in a
limited range of decisions. The same cannot be said of many informal
kinship caregivers, who comprise the overwhelming majority of kinship
caregiving arrangements in the United States.12 At present, there is no
reliable data on the number of private kinship caregivers who have actual
legal custody of or guardianship over the children they are raising. What
can be inferred from small-scale studies on this population, however, is
that a significant portion of these caregivers do not have legal custody or
guardianship of their relative minor charges.5 1 Without a legally50. Id. at 2.
51. A study comparing children in relative, nonrelative and group care reported that of
the one hundred children in kinship care in 1995, ninety-four percent said they were
"always loved" compared with eighty-two percent of children in nonrelative foster care
who reported the same. With respect to permanency outcomes, research reveals that "odds
of permanence are fifty-four percent lower for children living with nonrelated foster
parents than children living with grandparents, and thirty-four percent lower for children
living with aunts and uncles. The permanency odds for children living with other relatives
are not statistically different from those living with grandparents." See Mark F. Testa, The
Quality of Permanence-Lastingor Binding? Subsidized Guardianship and Kinship Care
as Alternatives to Adoption, 12 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 499, 522 (2005) (finding that based
on self-report of children, "[t]he odds of feeling a part of the family are three times as high
for foster children living with grandparents, aunts and uncles as compared to foster children
living in unrelated foster homes").
52. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
53. Findings from limited small-scale studies suggest that a significant percentage of
informal or private kinship caregivers have no legal arrangement for the care of their
grandchildren. Catherine C. Goodman & Merril Silverstein, Grandmothers Raising
Grandchildren: Ethnic and Racial Differences in Well-Being Among Custodial and
CoparentingFamihes,27 J. FAM. ISSUES 1605, 1610 (2006) (reporting that forty-one percent
of grandmothers have no legal arrangement for the care of their grandchildren); CHERYL
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recognized relationship to the child they care for, kinship caregivers often
face problems "enrolling the child in school, consenting to the child's
medical care, securing public assistance benefits for the child, and
accessing school records."- At the same time, the lack of clarity about a
caregiver's legal status likely undermines the stability of the caregiver-child
relationship, adding to the burden of a group that is already emotionally
and otherwise taxed.55
Currently, the only means for kinship caregivers to attain permanent,
legally-protected parental status is formal adoption. However, the
adoption process usually involves adversarial legal proceedings that pit
kinship caregivers against another relative, often their own adult child, in
order to gain some measure of security in their relationship with the
children they are raising. These proceedings are usually lengthy and
emotionally difficult for everyone involved. Not surprisingly, the process
of litigating these issues, as well as the outcomes, can seriously strain
family relationships rather than strengthen or support them. 6
Paradoxically, the process of formalizing relationships can thus move
families to a point of greater perceived risk: "The parent assumes a greater
risk of having parental rights terminated, the relative a greater risk of an
agency decision to transfer the child [to a different caregiver], and the
children a greater risk of losing a family."5 This kind of risk has a
SMITHGALL, SALLY MASON, LISA MICHELS, CHRISTINA LICALSI & ROBERT GEORGE,
CHAPIN HALL CTR. FOR CHILDREN AT THE UNIV. OF CHICAGO, CARING FOR THEIR
CHILDREN'S CHILDREN: ASSESSING THE MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS AND SERVICE
EXPERIENCES OF GRANDPARENT CAREGIVER FAMILIES 18-21 (2006) (reporting

approximately sixteen percent of grandparents have no legal arrangement), available at
http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/old-reports/305.pdf. In my previous research, I
found that more than one-third of the grandparent caregiver sample (N=83) lacked any
legal authority to care for their grandchildren. Sacha M. Coupet, Cognitive Appraisals and
Family Dynamics as Predictors of Adjustment and Well-Being in Elderly Black Kinship
Caregivers 100, 149 (1997) (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on
file with author). Many of these caregivers expressed their "fear of possible disruptions of
kinship placements by biological parents or social service agencies acting on behalf of
angry, spiteful, or indecisive parents." Id at 149. Their fear of losing the child in their care
and their desire to preserve the caregiving arrangement often made these caregivers feel
"alienat[ed] from the very agencies that are intended to provide assistance." Id.
Ultimately, caregivers' avoidance of helping agencies and perceived animosity between
caregivers and the system within which they are forced to operate resulted in increased
levels of caregiver stress. Id. Caregivers questioned aloud whether their demands for
assistance would involve relinquishment of some parental control. Id. Conversely, many
felt helpless at times to act on behalf of the children in their care without legal authority to
do so, fearing that even the guardianship agreements some had provided too few
safeguards and too little reassurance of permanence in the caregiving relationship. See id
at 150-51.
54. Jeffrey C. Goelitz, Answering the Call to Support Elderly Kinshio Caregivers,15
ELDER L. J. 233, 244 (2007).
55. Id.
56. Burrs, supra note 16, at 7.
57. Madeline L. Kurtz, The Purchaseof Families into Foster Care: Two Case Studies
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temporal dimension as well, especially for older or elderly relative
caregivers. Without any legal formality, these older caregivers lack
authority to make permanent plans for the child or direct her care after
their own incapacity or death. Permanency, a critical dimension of child
welfare decision making, is thus of particular concern among this group of
nonparent caregivers?8 In short, there is a tension between the potential
costs of seeking legal recognition of a kinship caregiver's parenthood and
the benefits gained by such a recognition.
It is important to note that the tenuousness of the legal relationships
does not necessarily lead to worse caregiving arrangements. As illustrated
by caregiver reports of their long-term commitments to caregiving, many
kinship caregivers are committed to remain parents to relative minors even
without the corresponding title of "parent," and remain devoted even
though their perceptions of permanence are not reflected in legal
protections that would assure lasting caretaking?9 In comparing relative
caregivers as adopted parents and relative caregivers as long-term
guardians, Mark Testa found negligible differences between the two
groups with respect to stability of placement-a reasonable proxy for
commitment to caregiving.?
Similarly, children perceive relative
caregivers as substitute parents, with commitments to caring for them that
mirror those of legal parents.61 According to Testa, "kinship [itself]
appears to be the common denominator underlying caregivers' intent to
raise a child to adulthood, children's sense of belonging, and the continuity
and stability of care both before and after legal permanence."62
D. Stigma andLegitimacy: Kinshi Caregiversas Parents,or Why the
"P" Word Matters

While kinship caregivers do not have the same legal rights over the
children they care for, many kinship caregivers speak about their
circumstances as if they too carried (or ought to carry) the designation of
legal parent. In my own extensive work within the kinship caregiving
community, I have observed countless relative caregivers at conferences,
and the Lessons They Teach, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1453, 1521 (1994).
58. Goelitz, supra note 54, at 244-245 ("The need to implement legally enforceable
alternative permanency plans for the child is even greater among elderly caregivers, for
whom mortality and morbidity are relatively immediate concerns.").
59. See Testa, supra note 51, at 533 (describing research that finds that even kin who
do not adopt, and hence do not have title of parent, remain committed to caring for the
children they are raising).
60. Id. at 525, 528.
61. See id. at 524 (finding that children with private guardians were no less likely to
report that they felt part of the family with whom they were living than children who were
formally adopted by nonparent caregivers).
62. Id. at 533.
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community meetings, and support groups. These caregivers often express
an expectation that they should have a role in the proceedings concerning
their relative minors that corresponds with their parental conduct, and
voice anger and frustration at the legal system's failure to accord them a
meaningful opportunity to participate. Many ask, "Where are ourrights as
parents?"
The attribution of parental status matters to kinship caregivers for the
practical and expressive value that the "p" word carries, 63 the compromised
well-being associated with exclusion from the class of persons regarded as
legitimate parents, and the resulting stigma that their families bear.
Journalist Nell Bernstein provides a moving description of the impact of
questions regarding whether grandparent caregivers parenting
grandchildren are legitimately "parents."
The questions that drive "eligibility" - whose child is this,
anyway? -bear little relationship to the reality of grandparents'
lives: they are caring for their grandchildren while their children
are gone. When grandparents describe the struggles they face
trying to enroll their grandchildren in school, get medical care for
them, or seek government assistance-the shame and fear they
face in their dealings with public institutions- one is reminded of
the experience of undocumented immigrants."
In another particularly poignant example of the significance of
parental identity and role, a grandmother raising her granddaughter
described a conversation she had with the granddaughter whom she is
raising:
[She] asked her granddaughter, Paula, 'Do you want me to be
your grandmother acting like a parent or should I just be your
mothe'?' Paula replied, "If I am your grandchild I will not have a
mother or father. And if I don't have you I don't have anybody."
When her grandmother signed the custody papers, Paula said,
"Grandma, when I go to school tomorrow can I tell them I have a
realMom now?" Clearly, Paula needed her grandmother to play
the role of parent. As Paula ages, her feelings may change or
perhaps she will always need to see her grandmother in the guise
of "parent." 5
63. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Parentsby the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 58
(2008) [hereinafter Appleton, Parents by the Numbers] ("[T]he ['p' word] matters for
several reasons even apart from the specific rights and duties that parental status typically
entails [because] the label and the status it signifies have considerable expressive value.").
64. BERNSTEIN, supranote 3, at 136.
65. Grandparenting.org, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren, http://www.grand
(last visited Dec. 3, 2010)
parenting.org/GrandparentsRaisingGrandchildren.htm
(emphasis added) (citing ARTHUR KORNHABER, THE GRANDPARENT GUIDE : THE
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Faced with the challenge of reconciling family law's philosophical aims
with the evolving reality of changing family form and structure, we are
forced to figure out what place nontraditional families might occupy and
whether their perceived roles can better align with their legal titles. As
shown by these examples, departure from the traditional nuclear family
norm comes with a price for most kinship caregiving families. The degree
to which they resemble, or are distinct from, the traditional nuclear family
does more than undermine caregivers' parental status claims: it also
frequently makes these caregivers feel stigmatized and excluded from
debates about what constitutes a family.
The ability of kinship caregivers to claim parental status is further
complicated by the acrimonious tenor of contemporary debates about
which particular families and what particular family constellations are
legitimate. 6 The narrative used to refer to or describe kinship caregiving
families illustrates the exclusion and stigma attached to them. In one
recent example, an article describing the challenges facing a kinship
caregiving family touted aid delivered "to help the makeshift family stay
intact and even thrive."' The author's use of the word "makeshift" implies
a family that is contrived or cobbled together, rather than "genuine."
As a highly disproportionate share of kinship caregiving families are
families of color, the racial and cultural tenor of this debate is impossible
to ignore. As Twila Perry keenly observes, "attitudes toward the structure,
value and function of families do not exist in a vacuum" but reflect cultural
norms, and power structures, both of which are heavily influenced by
race.8 Indeed, black families, "have [long] been at the center of debates
[over 'family values,'] owing to their differences from 'mainstream'
American families in terms of family structure, living arrangements, and
childrearing practices." 69 Very few assessments of black families actively
defend their often nontraditional forms as on a par with the nuclear family
ideal. To the contrary, the kinship family has historically been viewed as a
pathological form of social organization.70 Multigenerational femaleDEFINITIVE GUIDE TO COPING WITH THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN GRANDPARENTING

(2002)).
66. Vonnie McLoyd, Nancy Hill & Kenneth Dodge, Introduction: Ecological and
Cultural Diversity in African American FamilyLife, in AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE:
ECOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 3 (Vonnie McLoyd, Nancy Hill & Kenneth
Dodge eds., 2005).

67. Erik Eckholm, Florida Shifts Child-Welfare System's Focus to Saving Families,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2009, at A12 (emphasis added), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/07/25/us/25florida.html.
68. Twila Perry, Family Values, Race, Feminism and Public Policy, 36 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 345, 346 (1996) [hereinafter Perry, Family Values].
69. McLoyd, Hill & Dodge, supra note 66, at 3.
70. Kessler, supra note 4, at 50. The most notorious example of this framing is
evidenced in the report prepared by Daniel Patrick Moynihan in which he castigated black
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headed households, highly flexible and adaptive familial roles, strong
familial cohesion, and shared caregiving-the very traits that have helped
black families to survive substantial hardship-have been framed, from a
Anglo-American majority perspective, as a "failure of values and
morality" at best, and a hopeless "tangle of pathology" at worst.,
Undoubtedly, the marginalization of kinship caregivers reflects the
In the
marginalization suffered by black families in general.
contemporary, more subtly discriminatory cultural context in which race is
increasingly "'coded as culture,' family structure, especially the application
of white nuclear family norms, is a central marker of cultural difference
and implied status differentiation."72 The current marriage-centered
approach to parenthood has a disproportionate impact on black families
due to the declining rates of marriage among African-Americans.13 Racial
discrimination and the nonnormative nature of many black families are
used to mutually reinforce their exclusion from the privileges reserved for
more "traditional" kinds of families.
As evolving conceptions of marriage and parenthood continue to
stoke debate, and as departure from the nuclear family norm continues to
be conflated with dysfunction, kinship caregiving families will continue to
find themselves in this stigmatized and marginalized place. Existing social
science literature shows that such stigma has innumerable negative effects
on psychological well-being, including a diminished sense of social
citizenship as a result of exclusion. 74 In examining the effects that
family forms and hypothesized that the destruction of the black nuclear family would
hinder further progress towards economic, political, and social equality. DANIEL P.
MOYNIHAN, OFFICE OF POL'Y, PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO
FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965) (noting that "at the heart of the
deterioration of the fabric of Negro society is the deterioration of the Negro family"),
availableat http://www.dol.gov/oasam/ programs/history/moynchapter2.htm.
71. Perry, Family Values, supranote 68, at 350.
72. M. Belinda Tucker & Angela D. James, New Families, New Functions:
PostmodernAfrican American Familiesin Context, in AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE:
ECOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY, supra note 66, at 86.

73. Between 2000 and 2008, the percentage of blacks who had never married increased
from forty-two to forty-eight percent among men, and forty to forty-four percent among
women and now substantially exceeds the proportion of the black population currently
married-thirty-five and twenty-seven percent, respectively. U.S. Census Bureau, Marital
Status of People 15 Years and Over, by Age, Sex, Personal Earnings, Race, and Hispanic
2008, Table Al,
Origin, 2008, America's Families and Living Arrangements:
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2008.html (last visited July 11,
2009). These figures stand in sharp contrast to the rates of marriage within white, non-

Hispanic communities. Between 2000 and 2008 the percentage of white non-Hispanics who
had never married increased from twenty-seven to twenty-nine percent among men, and
twenty-one to twenty-two percent among women, figures that are dwarfed by the
proportion of white non-Hispanic men and women married in 2008-fifty-seven and fiftyfour percent, respectively. Id.
74. CL Scott Weber, Parenting, Family Life, and Well-Being Among Sexual
Minorities: Nursing Policy and Practice Implications, 29 ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH
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exclusion and stigmatization will have on nontraditional families, including
kinship caregivers and the children they are raising, the normative
question we should ask is whether "the psychological and social costs to
society of the marginalization and exclusion of ... [stigmatized families]
outweigh any perceived benefit to the broader community that could
possibly be derived from that exclusion."75
E.

Conclusion

Just like the caregivers Stack observed,'7 kinship caregivers may
function within both a folk system in which their parental roles are
acknowledged and respected and within a legal system in which their role
is more closely analogized to that of a legal stranger. Their "folk-based"
claims to parenthood derive from a relationship to the child devoid of any
dimension of conjugality. Although both "horizontal" (conjugal or quasiconjugal) and "vertical" (nonconjugal relative) adult caregivers may
answer the question, "Ain't I a parent?," in the affirmative, only conjugal
or quasi-conjugal partners' perceptions and self-conceptions of parenthood
are supported in law. Kinship caregivers, left to forge their own identities,
are currently caught between their perceptions of their relationship to the
child they care for and the "reality" of their limited rights under the law.
This raises the central question of to what degree the law can, or ought to,
reflect or validate perceptions and self-conceptions of parenthood, and
upon what underlying rationale.
III.
IT ALL DEPENDS ON WHAT YOU MEAN BY "PARENT"

What does it mean to accord an adult parental responsibility, legal
privilege, and the corresponding title of "parent?" In theory, "categorizing
someone as a parent presumptively ties his or her interests to the child's
interests. This means that parents' decisions about, or affecting, their child
are both presumptively cognizant of the child's needs and in the child's
'best' interests." 7 Parenthood thus protects the ability of certain adults to
make decisions regarding their children that are presumptively
controlling.78
601, 605 (2008) (noting that social antipathy toward alternative family
arrangements-specifically sexual minorities-can cause psychological effects such as "a
sense of separation and noninclusion from the broader community, and a kind of reduced
sense of mastery of life in the individual resulting from society's marginalizing behavior").
75. Id.
76. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
77. Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood,34 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 697 (2001).
78. See Katherine Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status: The Need
for Legal Treatment Alternatives When the Premise of the NuclearFamilyHas Failed,70
NURSING
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Traditionally, family law has defined parenthood as encompassing
several critical characteristics. First, it has long been accepted that
"[p]arenthood, with few exceptions, is an exclusive status... [allotted to]
only one set of parents for a child at any one time." 9 These parents are
"autonomous, possessing comprehensive privileges and duties that they
share with no one else."a Second, as Martha Fineman observes, "[t]he
contour of the family entitled to protection through privacy has historically
been defined as the reproductive unit of husband and wife, giving primacy
to the marital tie."" In other words, parenthood is traditionally a dyadic
relationship-two, and no more than two, adults can be considered the
parents of a child. Third, the law presumes that the two parents are
themselves engaged in a conjugal relationship with each other., This
presumption is so strong that when courts have extended parental rights to
adults outside of a traditional dyad, their analysis has centered on the
capacity of these adults to be in a marriage-like relationship with a legal
parent or, at the very least, capable of prescribed mating with a legal
Within this context, parenthood is thus fundamentally
parent.3
horizontal-a relationship shared within, rather than across, generations

by virtue of a conjugal or quasi-conjugal tie. Viewing parenthood in this
context, it becomes apparent that it is primarily the third core dimension of
parenthood-conjugality-that precludes the formal recognition of shared
or multiple co-parenting within kinship caregiving families.
A. Exclusive: The SuperiorRights Doctrine
The principal barrier to claims for access to, or authority over, children
by third parties, including kinship caregivers, is the superior right enjoyed
by biological or legal parents over the claims asserted by nonparents.
Early in its family law jurisprudence, the Supreme Court carved out
parents' superior right to "establish a home and bring up children" from
the general constitutional principle of liberty within the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." As the Court subsequently found,
"[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; [as] those who nurture
L. REV. 879, 884-85 (1984) (noting extensive list of parental rights, including, among
others, right to custody, religious upbringing, and medical decision-making).
79. Id.at 879.
80. Id
81. MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 110
(2004).
82. See Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood,42
GA. L. REV. 649, 651 (2008) (expressing belief that marriage serves as an efficient
mechanism for determining parenthood, and noting that "[wjithout the law of marriage, we
do not know who parents are").
83. See supra Part 111(B).
84. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
VA.
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him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.",, Whether due to
the intimacy of affection, fiduciary responsibility, or ownership interest in
the child, parents were understood to have a privilege and corresponding
burden to the care, custody, and control of their offspring."
The presumption of exclusive parental rights, as embodied in the
Court's superior rights doctrine, ultimately curtails the ability of kinship
caregivers to gain parental status. Although the Court's early cases
focused directly on line-drawing conflicts pitting parents against the state,
more recently the Court's superior rights doctrine came to be used as a
shield against intrusion by private third-party nonparents in Troxel v.
Granville.1 In Troxel, paternal grandparents sought visitation with their
granddaughters under what the Court characterized as a "breathtakingly
broad"" Washington State statute that granted visitation to any person at
any time that it was deemed to be in the child's best interests. 9 The legal
mother, who had not been found unfit, did not object to all visitation, but
only to the amount that the grandparents were requesting." When the
lower court ordered more visitation than the legal mother desired, she
appealed.9t The Washington State Supreme Court," and later the U.S.
Supreme Court,3 held that the statute unconstitutionally infringed on
parents' fundamental right to rear their children.
Although the plurality's decision in Troxel ultimately turned on the
"sweeping breadth" of the Washington State statute, 94 a majority of the
U.S. Supreme Court fundamentally upheld the superior rights of parents.95
85. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
86. Family law scholars, most notably Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, have critiqued
these early parental rights cases for the ways in which they reified the notion of children as
chattel and the superior rights doctrine as an assertion of ownership interests above all.
See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, " Who Owns the Child?":Meyer andPierceand the
Child as Property,33 WM. & MARY L. REv.995 (1992).

87. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
88. Id. at 67.

89. Id.at 60.
90. Id. at 71.
91. Id. at 60.

92. See id. at 63 (citing In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 28-30 (Wash. 1998)).
93. Id.

94. Id. at 73. See also id. at 77-78 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that Washington
State statute was overbroad as "Meyert repeatedly recognized right of upbringing would
be a sham if it failed to encompass the right to be free of judicially compelled visitation by
'any party' at 'any time' a judge believed he 'could make a "better" decision' than the
objecting parent had done").
95. As described in greater detail below, the plurality opinion did not dispute the
notion that the parental decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their children
should be accorded "special weight." Id at 73. In his concurrence, Justices Thomas
similarly indicated that parents maintained superior rights as against third parties. See id. at
80 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Plarents have a fundamental constitutional right to rear their
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The core of the case was a question concerning visitation, which is
reasonably regarded as a less intrusive interference than the more
substantive claim of child custody, although visitation is sometimes
regarded as merely a lesser form of custody." The plurality in Troxel did
not determine the future of all third-party nonparental claims, declining to
"define ... the precise scope of the parental due process right in the
visitation context."" Indeed, the Court noted that "[b]ecause much statecourt adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would
be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the
Due Process Clause as a per se matter." 8 Yet the Court held that the
decisions of fit parents should be accorded "special weight" in the face of
challenges by nonparent third parties. 9 In doing so, the Court privileged
parental claims to care, custody (even if only access to versus custody of),
and control of children made by fit parents over similar claims asserted by
third parties.
While the Court's decision in Troxel neither unequivocally resolved
the precise metes and bounds of parental claims, nor elaborated the
criteria for inclusion or exclusion from the class of persons privileged as
parents, the decision has since been used to justify the curtailment of thirdparty claims to parental rights.'0 As Katherine Bartlett observed more
than two decades ago, "[c]urrent law provides virtually no satisfactory
children, including the right to determine who shall educate and socialize them.... Here,
the State of Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest-to say nothing of a
compelling one-in second-guessing a fit parent's decision regarding visitation with third
parties.").
96. Domestic relations statutes in most states establish distinct rules for standing and
standards governing child visitation versus custody claims. Compare, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/601(b) (2010) (granting standing to parent seeking custody of her child by filing
petition "for dissolution of marriage or legal separation or declaration of invalidity of
marriage; or ... for custody of the child, in the county in which he is permanently resident
or found" and to grandparent who is the parent or stepparent of deceased parent if the
surviving parent had been absent for a month, was in prison, or was under criminal justice
supervision) with 5/607(a) (stating that noncustodial parents are "entitled to reasonable
visitation rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger
seriously the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health" and that grandparents
"may file petition for visitation rights to minor child if there is unreasonable denial of
visitation by parent and at least one of" several conditions exist, such as the absence of one
parent).
97. 530 U.S. at 73.
98. Id. at 73.
99. Id at 70.
100. The Troxel decision has been incorrectly yet widely interpreted as holding thirdparty nonparent visitation statutes categorically unconstitutional. See Solangel Maldonado,
When Father (or Mother) Doesn't Know Best: Quasi-Parentsand ParentalDeference
After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865, 869 (2003) (noting that a "number of state
courts have held their third party visitation statutes unconstitutional under Troxel" and
"[o]ther courts, while not eliminating third party visitation completely, have imposed
substantial hurdles to visitation").
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[third-party caregivers] . . . because the

presumption of exclusive parenthood requires that these relationships
compete with others for legal recognition."o This assessment remains
accurate today.
A call to expand the pool of persons deemed to be vested with
parental authority does not necessarily directly challenge the superior
rights doctrine, but rather seeks to explore the precise factors that
influence the membership of persons vested with this superior right of
access to and influence over the lives of children. Indeed, "the parental
rights doctrine-as a logical matter-does not dictate the number of
'parents' a child may have."" It is similarly logical that a multiple
parentage model, like the traditional model, retains the core features of
exclusivity, since some group of persons-whether two, three, or morewill still be vested with "comprehensive privileges and duties that they
share with no one else," to the exclusion of others who are ineligible by
virtue of their nonparent status. 03 Even those scholars who are
apprehensive of multiple parentage must recognize that nothing in the
superior rights doctrine itself limits the actual number of people in whom
an exclusive and superior parental right vests. Thus, opposition to this
model will have to be grounded in the other dimensions of parenthood.
B. Dyadic: The "Rule of Two"

An underlying assumption of the superior rights doctrine is the socalled "rule of two," the operative rule constraining parental claims to an
exclusively dyadic model. As Susan Appleton has observed, "Family law,
as part of the larger prevailing culture, has enshrined the number two. By
constructing links among sex, marriage and procreation and
conceptualizing each as a practice for two, family law takes as its paradigm
the couple or pair."m Because the "ideology of the nuclear family does
not script a significant role for the extended family, or for other members
of the community who may play key roles in the lives of children," family
law constructs "boundaries that exclude all but a limited number of
relationships as legally relevant."'o
Courts' attachment to the dyadic model seems logical considering that
101. Bartlett, supra note 78, at 881. See also Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents as
Third Partiesin Relation to Their Stepchildren,40 FAM. L.O. 81, 85 (2006) (observing that
"adherence to the traditional [two-parent] model of the family has slowed the willingness of
lawmakers to extend family recognition to [third parties] who serve as parent figures for
minor children").
102. Appell, supranote 77, at 788 (emphasis added).
103. Bartlett, supra note 78, at 879.
104. Appleton, Parentsby the Numbers, supranote 63, at 11.
105. Allison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challengingthe Paradigmof
the Exclusive Family,6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 506-507 (1998).
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"[p]arenthood [has long been] understood to be largely a natural relation
founded upon biological reproduction, and legal status as a parent
followed easily from recognition of that natural fact-or, in the case of
adoption, from the formal creation of a substitute relation designed to
replicate as closely as possible the biological original."'a Such substitute
relations-lesser forms of parenthood-are now embraced in proportion
to their reflection of the prevailing heterosexual norm, otherwise defined
as heterosexual mating within a socially prescribed sexual relationship. As
Susan Appleton observes, "the allure of a [dyadic model] lies in its ability
to naturalize a normative reality in which only enduringly monogamous
heterosexual couples reproduce."1" Along a spectrum recognizing parental
claims relative to the heterosexual married norm, the farther one is from
the norm, the weaker one's corresponding parental claim.
Courts use the term "third party" to differentiate between those who
possess rights and responsibilities of parents and those outside of this class.
The term perfectly identifies what the "rule of two" aims to distinguishliterally any person outside the traditional dyadic parentage model. In
addition to signaling membership within a protected class of parents, the
"rule of two" also intimates, perhaps unfairly, alleged differences in the
quality and type of attachment had by third-party adult caregivers and
children. By favoring the two parents who created a child, the "rule of
two" places any other possible parental figures in a subordinate, or
inferior, position. Third-party parenting is regarded as a nonnormative
substitute for traditional dyadic parenting, a perception reflected in the
rules governing third-party standing. Third-party contenders, regardless of
the quality of their relationship with the child, must first survive
presumptions favoring the traditional parental dyad. Only after the failure
or absence of a traditional parent is established do courts assess the quality
and type of attachment between the third party and the child,1m suggesting
106. David D. Meyer, Parenthoodin a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal,
Biologicaland Social Conceptionsof Parenthood,54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 125-126 (2006).
107. Appleton, Parentsby the Numbers, supra note 63, at 21.

108. In Troxel v. Granville,for example, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children and, consequently,
that a finding of parental unfitness is required for the state to interfere in the private realm
of the family. 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000). Such state interference includes permitting thirdparty nonparents to seek custody of children. This presumption was recently reinforced in
In re Custody of E.A. T. W., in which the Washington State Supreme Court held that a
Washington State third-party custody statute requires, among other things, that nonparents
petitioning for custody "set forth factual allegations that, if proved, would establish that the
parent is unfit or the child would suffer actual detriment if placed with the parent." 227
P.3d 1284, 1288 (Wash. 2010). This presumption is also evident in various state statutes
governing child custody, in which third parties are granted standing to petition for custody
only if they first demonstrate that a natural parent is either deceased, incapacitated, or
unfit. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(b)(4) (2010) (permitting grandparent to petition
for child custody only if one parent is deceased and surviving parent is unfit). Only after a
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that this nonnormative parental relationship is only worth assessing after
the normative one is found to be deficient.
C Hoizontal:PrivilegingConjugality

In a simplistic sense, marital status helps organize parenthood by
making the identification of dyadic pairs more efficient, if not entirely
accurate. Marriage has been so critical to the establishment of a parentchild relationship that the legal rights of a child under early common law
hinged on the marital status of his parents: a child born outside of marriage
occupied the status of nullius filius, which literally means "the son of no
one.""'0 Although the significance of marriage to the distribution of rights
and benefits to the child has diminished with the elimination of distinctions
based on legitimacy,n0 parental rights are still under the shadow of
marriage.
Marriage's central role in defining parentage is evident in the
"[tiraditional principles identifying a child's mother by birth and the father
primarily on the basis of a man's marriage to the mother.""'
In
heterosexual marriages, even where paternity tests reveal that a child's
biological father is not his mother's spouse, the marital presumption may
continue to apply because it is protective of "both marriage and the child's
established bonds within an intact marital family from external
disruption."11 2 The presumption operates in various ways across the U.S.,
with some states granting only a wife and her husband standing to
challenge the presumption, and others allowing the presumption to be
rebutted if doing so is in the best interests of the child." 3 Parenthood, as
third party establishes such standing will courts consider the merits of the case-i.e.,
whether custody of a child by a third party is in the best interests of that child.
109. See BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *459 (observing that rights of children born
out of wedlock, sometimes called filius nullius,are very few).
110. A number of Supreme Court cases from the late 1960s through the 1970s held
that classifications based on legitimacy were unconstitutional. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (holding that Louisiana workmen's
compensation statute that denied equal recovery rights to dependent unacknowledged
illegitimate children violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding that denial to illegitimate children of right to
recover for wrongful death of their mother on whom they were dependent violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Glona v. American Guar. &
Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (holding that witholding relief to mother of child killed in
automobile accident merely because child was born out of wedlock would be denial of
equal protection of the laws). But see, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979)
(upholding Georgia statute that precludes father who has not legitimated child from suing
for wrongful death of child).
111. Appleton, Parentsby the Numbers, supranote 63, at 16.
112. Meyer, supra note 106, at 128 (citing Michael H v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989)).
113. Susan F. Appleton, PresumingWomen: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy
in the Same-Sex Couples Era,86 B. U. L. REV. 227, 234-236 (2006) [hereinafter Appleton,
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Annette Appell observes, thus has at its core a central mothering
dimension that brings together the critical aspects of biology and
caretaking-"a biological connection between the mother and child; a
nurturing connection between the prospective other parent and the
mother; or a nurturing and genetic connection to the child."' 14 An adult's
relationship to the mother is so central that "[p]arenthood, as a
constitutional matter, can be lost for failure to earn it by caring for the
child ... or it can be usurped by a person who shows affection for the

mother by marrying her.""' Arguably, marriage itself is simply a proxy for
relatedness to the mother (whose biological and caretaking connection to
the child are presumed through gestation) and a mechanism for assuring
that the other party acquiring legal parental status, apart from the
biological mother, is a deserving partner to her. In this sense, third-party
parental status is dominated by the relationship to the mother, or the
degree to which third parties are able to gain parental status by fulfilling
their roles towards mothers.
As the obstacles facing kinship caregivers illustrate, however, not all
biological relatedness and caregiving is regarded equally. Even bloodrelatives who develop a caretaking connection to both mother and childlike grandparents, aunts, or uncles-will still find their co-parenting claims
dismissed."6 As a result, "the existing boundaries of the legal family fail to
encompass the diverse ways that families function [the result being that]
states support some families more than others," even when marriage
appears to serve no obvious purpose, such as in the determination of
parentage.' Despite the reasonably grounded criticism that "marriage is
[not] an inherently more valuable relationship than others, including
nonconjugal relationships characterized [instead] by care and/or
interdependence," privileges that attach through marriage persist."8
Courts' privileging of conjugal-centered relationships over those based
Presuming Women] (internal citations omitted). According to Appleton, there are four
primary approaches regarding such presumptions in use today. Id at 234. In nine states,
the marital presumption grants standing to rebut only to the mother or her husband. Id. at
234. Twelve states allow the presumption to be rebutted if doing so would be in the best
interests of the child. Id. at 235. At least six jurisdictions allow a husband to disestablish
paternity at the time of divorce, regardless of the relationship he and the child had
established during marriage, i.e., regardless of the child's best interests. Id. at 235-236. A
few states recognize a "right" on the part of putative fathers to challenge a husband's status
as father. Id. at 236.
114. Appell, supranote 77, at 694.
115. Id.
116. See infraPart V(A).
117. Laura A. Rosenbury, Fiends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189,198 (2007).
118. Id. at 198-200. Michael Warner has similarly argued that "[m]arriage sanctifies
some couples at the expense of others. It is selective legitimacy." Michael Warner, Beyond
Gay Mariage,in LEFr LEGALISM, LEFT CRITIQUE 259-289 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley
eds., 2002).
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on interdependency or caregiving has been the subject of rich scholarly
inquiry, mostly aimed at decoupling parental benefits from marital status
for the purposes of distributing responsibilities and rights across a broader
pool of persons." 9 Such scholars are critical of the ways in which the
present system directs tangible benefits, as well as intangible moral
approval, toward married couples. 2 0 They argue that the critical
dimension relevant to defining families and channelling benefits ought to
be caretaking, which they reasonably regard as having greater inherent
social value, rather than sexual relationships. They also argue that the
sexual dyad-including same-sex and heterosexual couples-is less
deserving of a preferential claim to social resources relative to the
caretaking model, because the caretaking model best reflects the role that
society expects families to perform. 2'
Moreover, these critics argue that the law already ties rights and
responsibilities regarding children to parenthood, not to marriage, and as
such, marriage should never be a dividing line when the law's express
purpose is the protection of children's interests. As Nancy Polikoff argues,
"A legal system in a pluralistic society that values all families should meld
as closely as possibly the purposes of a law with the relationships that law
covers."'22 Polikoff aptly stresses the need for the boundaries of family
definition and presumptions of family status to hew more closely to the
underlying purpose of the relevant law. In this sense, a law designed to
address the various aspects of dependency of children upon caretakers
would automatically include those who had provided ongoing care for a
substantial period of time given the child's age and circumstance.
Not surprisingly, and consistent with family law's "channelling"
approach,'" marriage-centered definition of parenthood achieves its
119. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 81; NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND
GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008) [hereinafter POLIKOFF,
BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE]; Melissa Murray, The Networked Family:
Refraining the Understandingof Caregivingand Caregivers,94 VA. L. REV. 385 (2008);

Nancy D. Polikoff, Making MarriageMatter Less: The ALI Domestic PartnerPrincioles
Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353 [hereinafter Polikoff,
Making MarriageMatterLess];Rosenbury, supra note 117, at 198.
120. See generally,POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE, supra note
119.
121. See generally, FINEMAN, supranote 81.
122. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE, supranote 119, at 128.
123. The channelling approach refers to the channelling function described in Carl
Schneider's oft-cited article of the same title. Carl Schneider, The ChannellingFunction in
Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 495, 498 (1992). The channelling function of family law
refers to the development of family law as a mechanism to channel individuals into
fundamental social institutions of greatest value to society-such as marriage. Id See also
Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the Chanelling
Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2134 (2007) (questioning the continued
relevance of the channelling function in the context of contemporary debates about the
state of the family and family law).
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intended effect of privileging conjugality. Indeed, "[f]amily law's focus on
marriage to the exclusion of other [nonconjugal relationships] ...
encourage[s] people to prioritize one comprehensive domestic relationship
over other relationships."124 Although touted as "remarkably flexible and
responsive to diverse family formations that both honor and support the
role and place of the family in our constitutional system," traditional
parental rights doctrine remains inflexible in its attachment to conjugality.
It categorically excludes from the list of potential co-parents those persons
who lack a conjugal-like relationship to a legal parent.1 2 As noted above,
by assigning privileges based on conjugal status, family law creates
inequalities that arguably stigmatize certain families. 26 The resulting
hierarchies place kinship caregivers-who are prohibited from entering
into a marriage, or an intimate quasi-marital relationship, with the legal
mothers or fathers of the children they are raising-in a permanently
subordinate status when petitioning for co-extensive parenting rights.
Neither the exclusive nor dyadic dimensions of parenthood foretell
this result. As a logical matter, "the parental rights doctrine ... does not

dictate the number of 'parents' a child may have."12 7 In theory, relatives
can enjoy the autonomy accorded legal parents when they take the place
of one of the absent members of the dyad, typically only after completely
dismantling the original dyad. It is similarly logical that a multiple
parentage model, like the traditional model, retains the core features of
exclusivity, since some group of persons-whether two, three, or morewill still be vested with "comprehensive privileges and duties that they
share with no one else,"128 to the exclusion of others who are ineligible by
virtue of their nonparent status. A call to expand the pool of persons
vested with parental authority, therefore, does not directly challenge the
superior rights doctrine, but rather seeks to explore factors that influence
the membership of persons vested with this superior right.
Only conjugality, broadly defined as the relatedness to a biological
mother through marriage or some other enduring intimate and/or sexual
relationship ("quasi-conjugality"), serves as the real barrier for kinship
124. Rosenbury, supra note 117, at 191 (exploring legitimacy of claims by close friends
for benefits commensurate with their supportive role).
125. Appell, supranote 77, at 788.
126. Rosenbury, supranote 117, at 200-01.
127. Appell, supra note 77, at 788 (emphasis added). The argument that an extension
of parental rights beyond the "rule of two" automatically diminishes the authority granted
to the original dyad is offered in an almost arithmetic model, suggesting that the division of
the total bundle of parental rights across three or more persons yields smaller individual
shares than the individual share granted in a dyad. The movement to disaggregate the
bundle of parental rights suggests that it is possible, if not preferable, to conceive of
parental rights as the ascription of roles and responsibilities rather than a representative
percentage share.
128. Bartlett, supranote 78, at 879.
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caregivers seeking rights co-extensive with those of legal parents. In a
direct illustration of the manner in which the dimensions of exclusivity and
dyadism are themselves wrapped around a conjugality core, exclusion from
the possibility of marriage effectively places kin out of contention for
status as a second-or, in cases where it may be appropriate, even thirdparent.
D. Conclusion

Driven by historical preference and judicial ease, family law currently
defines parenthood as an exclusive status shared by two adults in a
conjugal relationship. This definition necessarily excludes adults who do
not have all of these characteristics- including kinship caregivers-from

achieving parental status. It also fails
relationship between the adult and the
discussed below, a broader definition of
caregivers greater access to a larger share

to give sufficient weight to the
child they wish to parent. As
parenthood would grant kinship
of the bundle of parental rights.

IV.
MARRIAGE's HELPING HAND: EXPANDING FAMILY, EXPANDING
PARENTHOOD, STILL OMITrlNG KIN

In recent years, parental status has been expanded to adults outside of
a traditional heterosexual dyad-namely, within stepfamilies, same-sex
couples, and those utilizing ART. As shown in these cases, courts'
evolving conceptions of parenthood go far, indeed, in accommodating the
shifting realities of contemporary family life and fostering the pluralism
family law is said to espouse. Yet however expansive the evolving doctrine
of parental status appears, family law remains oriented towards certain
adult pairings, privileging one class of adults over others. For example, in
stepparent adoption, courts rely on the stepparent's marital bond to a
child's legal parent to grant parental rights to a nonparent adult, reifying
conjugality as a defining feature of parenthood. Similarly, in cases where
the pool of possible parental candidates is greater than two-in the context
of same-sex couples and couples utilizing ART-courts seek out conjugal,
quasi-conjugal, or prescribed mating relationships to define and limit who
can obtain parental rights. In doing so, courts have continued to employ a
narrow definition of parenthood, preventing successful intergenerational
or intrafamilial parenting claims. Abrogations of the dyadic parental norm
have taken place only within the broad shadow of marriage.
' A. Stepparents

Margaret Mahoney has rightly observed that, "In spite of the long
history of stepfamily issues in the legal arena, and the increased demand
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for regulation in recent decades, little progress has been made in
establishing a clear or consistent legal definition of the stepparent
status." 129 Nonetheless, stepparents occupy a uniquely privileged position
within the broader class of third-party quasi-parents vying for parental
recognition.ln Unlike other third parties who may function in a parental
role, residential stepparents who seek to move into the role of legal parent
face the least resistance from courts, provided that the allocation of
parental rights adheres to the "rule of two."
Stepparents may petition for full parental rights over their partners'
children through what is known as stepparent adoption-a procedure
specifically provided for by domestic relations statutes in every state.131
Stepparent adoption, in most instances, avoids the thorny issue of multiple
parentage by requiring that the parental status of the noncustodial parent
be terminated prior to adoption either through consent, court order, or
death. 132 Because stepparent adoption relies on a substitutive, rather than
an additive model-replacing a legal parent with a stepparent of the same
gender-courts will not ascribe parental status to a stepparent if a living
noncustodial parent wishes to remain in her parental role.133
As a general rule, stepparents who do not adopt their stepchildren can
disclaim a parent-child relationship to the children of their partners upon
divorce from the legal parent.' The extinction of the marital nexus also
extinguishes the stepparent-stepchild bond, thus restoring the stepparent
to the status of legal stranger. Yet some courts have held that even
stepparents who do not formally adopt the children of their partners may
carry obligations of support to stepchildren in ways that infer the de facto
creation of a multiple parentage scenario.'3 The imposition of such
129. Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents as Third Parties in Relation to Their
Stepchildren, 40 FAM. L.Q. 81, 82 (2006).
130. See id. at 94 n.51 ("Stepparent adoptions receive special legal treatment,
compared with other categories of adoption, in certain provisions of the state adoption
codes.").
131. See id. at 85. Although stepparent adoption statutes may not explicitly exclude
couples in same-sex marriages, some courts have held that they apply to heterosexual

marriage only. See, e.g., S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S, 265 S.W.3d 804, 816 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).
132. Mahoney, supra note 129, at 89.
133. Consent of both the custodial and noncustodial parent is required in most
instances of stepparent adoption. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SvCs., STEPPARENT ADOPION 2 (2008), available at
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/ fstep.pdf.
134. Mahoney, supra note 129, at 85 ("The starting premise under the traditional
model of parenthood and family is that claims for legal recognition of the stepparent-child
relationship will be denied.").
135. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Hubbard, 44 P.3d 153 (Alaska 2002) (holding that, where
stepfather convinced his wife, the child's biological mother, to stop child support action
against child's biological father and requested that biological father relinquish his parental
rights and consent to child's adoption by stepfather, stepfather was equitably estopped from
disestablishing paternity for the purposes of paying child support); L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813
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obligations on stepparents, both within an intact marriage and postdivorce, is not grounded in any body of constitutional rights such as those
granted to legal parents.'36 It is also disfavored at common law.'3 1 Instead,
where courts have imposed parental obligations, they have done so based
on a theory of equitable estoppel, holding that a stepparent who represents
herself as a legal parent and whose conduct gives rise to a detrimental
reliance upon her for support is estopped from shirking post-divorce
support for the stepchild.13 8 In addition, state legislatures and courts have
developed other functional concepts for allocating stepparent rights and
responsibilities, including in loco parentis, de facto parent status, and
equitable adoption.'39 Where a court applies a standard such as in loco
parentis or the doctrine of equitable estoppel, involving proof of an
established parent-like relationship with the child to a residential
stepparent, she may be granted parental status for limited purposes, which
typically involve the imposition of child support obligations.140
In the rare instances where courts have extended the obligations of
legal parenthood to stepparents who do not adopt, the decisions have
turned on the unique position of a stepparent as a conjugal partner to a
legal parent, a status that sets stepparents apart from other nonconjugal
third parties.141 Marriage to the parent herself is what creates the
stepparent's parental obligations vis A vis the stepchild. It is not too far a
stretch to assume that those instances in which a stepparent is made to
bear obligations of support without a formal adoption may be laying the
groundwork for stepparents to argue for corresponding rights and
privileges to which they are currently not automatically entitled.142
A.2d 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (applying estoppel to hold former same-sex partner of
biological mother liable for child support, where former partner stood in loco parentis
status to the five children and had successfully petitioned for legal and partial physical
custody of the children).
136. LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, JUNE CARBONE & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 941
(4' ed. 2010) ("Even though ... most stepparents who live with their stepchildren support
them, stepparents have no common law child support duty.").
137. Id.
138. See Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 357-59 (N.J. 1984) (holding that equitable
estoppel applies where future support of a stepchild is undermined by previous reliance on
support of the stepparent); Monmouth County Div. of Soc. Servs. v. R.K., 757 A.2d 319,
327 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (applying holding in Miller to paternity action and
holding that boyfriend of mother is regarded as akin to stepparent); Lewis v. Lewis, 382
N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (attaching legal responsibility for stepchild to stepparent
due to stepparent's conduct in holding the child out as his own and providing support).
139. Mary Ann Mason & Nicole Zayac, Rethinking Stepparent Rights: Has the ALI
FoundaBetter Defhnition?,36 FAM. L.Q. 227, 230 (2002).
140. Mahoney, supra note 129, at 107. A residential stepparent lives with the child and

the custodial parent, as compared to a nonresidential stepparent who visits (along with the
noncustodial parent).
141. See supra note 135.

142. See David B. Sweet, Annotation, Stepparent's Postdivorce Duty to Support
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In observing the manner in which parental status is achieved for
stepparents, it is apparent that conjugality does the lion's share of the work
of ascribing parental identity, creating obligations and parental rights that
would not otherwise attach to this caregiving figure. The dyadic model
alone does not explain why the dissolution of the marriage between a
stepparent and legal parent would also dissolve the stepparent's parental
rights and responsibilities, as even after a divorce there remain two
persons who had occupied the parental class. At the same time, the dyadic
model does not explain why courts would use equitable doctrines to
impose parental obligations on third parties simply because they were, at
one time, the conjugal partner of the legal parent. The imposition of
obligations, and perhaps corresponding rights, doesn't appear to be based
on the number of caregiving adults, but rather on the kind, privileging
those connected to a legal parent, even if only formerly so, through a
conjugal tie. Conjugality appears to be the driving force behind courts'
decision-making in the case of stepparents.
B. Same-Sex Partnersof Parents
Among both married and unmarried same-sex couples, parental status
issues typically revolve around the unsettled question of the rights,
privileges, and obligations that attach to the same-sex partner of a
biological parent. As in the case of stepparents, the assessment of parental
claims in the context of same-sex partners is accompanied, or even
preceded, by an assessment of the status of the adult relationship.
However, in light of the varied landscape of legal options, including
marriage, for same-sex partners, laws pertaining to the extension of
parental prerogatives to the same-sex partners of biological parents are
complicated, confusing, and, as some scholars contend, too often counter
to the best interests of the child.143 The controversy pertaining to parental
Stepchild,44 A.L.R. 4th 520 § 2[a] (1986) ("At common law, the relationship of stepparent
and stepchild did not, of itself, confer any rights or impose any duties, but, in circumstances
varying among the states, a stepparent who voluntarily received a stepchild into his or her
family and treated the stepchild as a member thereof could place himself or herself in loco
parentisand assume an obligation to maintain and support the child.").
143. In Massachusetts, for example, where same-sex couples can marry, same-sex
spouses can use stepparent adoption procedures. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 210, § 1 (2007)
(providing that any "person of full age may petition the probate court in the county where
he resides for leave to adopt as his child another person younger than himself, unless such
other person is his or her wife or husband, or brother, sister, uncle or aunt, of the whole or
half blood"); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (holding that
Massachusetts adoption statute did not preclude same-sex partner of biological mother of
child from petitioning for adoption of the child where the adoption was in best interest of
the child). By contrast, Nancy Polikoff has expressed frustration with a New York court
decision finding that nonbiological mothers do not have to pay child support because the
state only recognizes paternitysuits and not maternity suits. Nancy Polikoff, New York
(May
29, 2009),
Parents
Children
of Lesbian
Hurts
Court Again
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claims in this context arises from the framing of parenthood through the
lens of marriage, which, in most instances, is still unavailable to same-sex
partners. Even in states where same-sex marriage is now legal,'" or in
those states where quasi-marital relationships like domestic partnerships
and civil unions are allowed,'145 questions pertaining to the resulting
parental status are neither clearly nor uniformly resolved.'"
The form of parental rights for partners of parents in same-sex
relationships- and also the subsequent confusion over their parental
status-comes from the application of default rules based on heterosexual
marital norms. That is, the more that same-sex couples can look like a
traditional heterosexual married couple or stepfamily, the more likely that
a same-sex partner will obtain parental rights. The need for resemblance
to a heterosexual marital norm reveals that the law defines parenthood, in
significant part, through whether an affectional, marital, or quasi-marital
bond exists between the caregiving adults. This conjugal orientation of
parental status recognition is evident in the two primary ways in which
http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot.com/2009/05/new-york-court-again-hurtschildren-of.html.
144. As of the time of writing, five states (Massachussetts, Connecticut, Iowa,
Vermont, and New Hampshire) and the District of Columbia had established legalized
same-sex marriage either by judicial or legislative decision. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
MARRIAGE EQUALITY

& OTHER

RELATIONSHIP

RECOGNITION LAWS,

available at

http://www.hrc.org/documents/ RelationshipRecognition LawsMap.pdf. Maryland and
New York officially recognize same-sex marriages performed outside of the state. Id. The
status of out-of-state same-sex marriages in Rhode Island is unclear: while the Rhode
Island Attorney General issued an advisory opinion declaring that the state could recognize
out-of-jurisdiction marriages, the Rhode Island Supreme Court subsequently refused to
grant a divorce to a same-sex couple legally married in Massachusetts. Id. Approximately
18,000 same-sex marriages performed in California during the period of time in which
same-sex marriage was legal are valid as per the California Supreme Court decision of May
26, 2009. Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 384 (Cal. 2009). Proposition 8, the ballot
measure banning same-sex marriage in California, was declared unconstitutional in August
2010 and, at the time of this writing, is currently on appeal. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 904, 1003-04 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
145. States in which domestic partnerships, or the equivalent (civil unions), provide a
panoply of spousal-equivalent rights include California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Washington
State, as well as the District of Columbia. Note that in Connecticut, Vermont, and New
Hampshire, same-sex marriage has replaced civil unions and domestic partnerships.
National Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic
Partnerships, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430 (last visited Sept. 24, 2010).
146. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own
Child: ParentageLaws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-Fhst Century, 5
STAN. J. CIv. RTS. & CIV. LIB. 201, 215-25 (2009) [hereinafter Polikoff, A Mother Should
Not Have to Adopt Her Own Childj (describing various ways in which lesbian mothers can
become legal parents, including presumptions of parentage granted to formalized couples
and obtaining an order of parentage or parental rights under state law). Part of the
confusion may stem from the fact that, unlike stepparents who are fairly uniformly
regarded, partners in same-sex relationships can be regarded by courts as falling into a
varying array of categories, including stepparent, second-parent, or co-parent.
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same-sex partners of parents have been able to acquire rights as parents:
the extension of some iteration of a marital presumption and a form of

second-parent adoption.14 7
As noted above, the traditional marital presumption was based on an
assumption that biological and social paternity arose in tandem."* Yet the
marital presumption also serves as a reward for marriage by allowing those
within the conjugal dyad to assert parental privilege. Some states have
extended the marital presumption that heterosexual married parents have
long enjoyed to same-sex married couples-i.e., the presumption that the
spouse of a married woman is also the parent, usually the father, of the
newborn child. 49 Even in states where same-sex marriage is not legal but
the near equivalent exists, marital presumptions have been successful in
facilitating the acquisition of parental rights by partners of biological
parents.150
147. Id. Some states have also relied on equitable principles to support the imposition
of parental obligations-a form of parental recognition-on same-sex partners of biological
parents. See L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872, 877 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that same-sex
partner of biological parent is estopped from disclaiming responsibility for emotional and
financial needs of children born into the adult relationship).
148. See infra Part III(B).
149. Appleton, Presuming Women, supra note 113, at 228. I use the term "marital
presumption" in place of the term "presumption of paternity" in light of the gendered
nature of the term. As noted above, the "marital presumption," which the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld in MichaelH v. GeraldD.,491 U.S. 110 (1989), regards a woman's husband
as the father of the child born during the marriage. See Meyer, supra note 106, at 127-28.
The presumption can only be overcome in limited circumstances where the husband does
not have access to his wife during the probable time of conception. Id.at 127.
150. See Appleton, Presuming Women, supra note 113, at 240-42. California and
Vermont's domestic partnership and civil union statutes permit same-sex partners to enjoy
all of the legal protections that exist in heterosexual marriage, presumably including
presumptions of parentage for spouses. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a), (d) (West 2004)
("egistered domestic partners shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall
be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law" and that "[tihe
rights and obligations of registered domestic partners with respect to a child of either of
them shall be the same as those of spouses"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a), (f) (2002 &
Supp. 2010) (stating that "[plarties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits,
protections and responsibilities under law ... as are granted to spouses in a marriage" and
"[tihe rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of whom either becomes the
natural parent during the term of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a married
couple, with respect to a child of whom either spouse becomes the natural parent during
the marriage"). The District of Columbia has extended the presumption to same-sex
partners of parents utilizing artificial insemination in relationships analogous to marriage.
See Domestic Partnership Judicial Determination of Parentage Amendment Act of 2009,
D.C. Law No. 18-33 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the D.C. CODE), available
(granting a
at http://newsroom.dc.gov/show.aspx/agency/csed/section/2/release/17851
presumption of parenthood to both the birth mother and a person who has consented, in
writing, to parent a child born of artificial insemination). Marital presumptions have also
been extended through caselaw to same-sex couples in states where marriage was not legal
at the time. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 666-67 (Cal. 2005) (holding
that, under the marital presumption, the domestic partner of the woman who gave birth to
a child was also legally the mother of that child).
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Although the existence of a marital presumption should create a
presumptive parental claim for same-sex partners of biological parents,
Such a presumption created within a
these claims are uncertain.
jurisdiction may not extend outside of the jurisdiction, particularly to states
that do not recognize same-sex marriages or quasi-marriages. In addition,
even in states where same-sex marriage is legal, same-sex partners of
parents may not be granted the full panoply of rights traditionally granted
to spouses.'
Consequently, even in those states where same-sex marriage, domestic
partnerships, or the equivalent, are legal, and where by statute or caselaw
presumptive parentage attaches, same-sex partners of parents are advised
to petition for parental rights through either stepparent or second-parent
adoption."2 In states that allow for comprehensive domestic partnerships
or civil unions, same-sex couples may petition for parental privileges,
usually using the same method as stepparents. Other states provide for a
process known as second-parent adoption."' Second-parent adoption
applies to same-sex married or domestic partners who have a child who is
legally or biologically related to only one partner.'" Through second151. A married lesbian couple in Iowa is suing to have both mothers listed on the
child's birth certificate after the state refused to extend the marital presumption to the
nonbiological mother. Lynda Waddington, Same-sex Couples Sues State for Right to
Appear on Daughter's Birth Certificate, IOWA INDEP., May 13, 2010, available at
http://iowaindependent.com/33946/same-sex-couple-sues-state-for-right-to-appear-ondaughters-birth-certificate.
152. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child,supra note 146, at
217. Same-sex partners of parents may also rely on co-parenting agreements, which,
although not as legally secure as adoption, establish an understanding of legal rights and
responsibilities of each co-parent. Margaret S. Osborne, Legalizing Families:Solutions to
AdjudicateParentagefor Lesbian Co-Parents,49 VILL. L. REV. 363, 370-71 (2004).
153. NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES 2
(2010), available at http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/LegalRecognition of
LGBT Families_04_2008 .pdf?doclD=2861. Sources do not agree on the number of states
in which second-parent adoptions are permitted. According to the National Center for
Lesbian Rights, sixteen states and the District of Columbia have a statute or appellate court
decision allowing same-sex couples to get a second-parent adoption, domestic partner
adoption, or civil union adoption. Id. Some individual counties within at least twelve other
states have granted second-parent adoption. Id at 3. However, other reports suggest that
second-parent adoption is available in twenty-five states and the District of Columbia.
Marissa Wiley, Redefining the Legal Family: Protectingthe Rights of Coparentsand the
Best Interests of Their Children,38 HOFSTRA L. REv. 319, 324 (2009). The legality of
second-parent adoption under state statutes is unclear in twenty-one states and appellate
decisions in three other states have ruled that second-parent adoptions are barred. Id This
confusion is the result of the widely different treatment of same-sex couples.
154. Id. Second-parent adoption is available to same-sex couples in California,
Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont, as well as in some jurisdictions in Alabama, Alaska,
Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington. HUMAN RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN, PARENTING LAWS 2 (2010), available at http://www.hrc.org/documents/
parenting-laws-maps.pdf.
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parent adoption, the same-sex partner of a parent may assume full
parental rights on a par with the biological parent, due primarily to the
presumed committed and ongoing intimate relationship between the adult
partners.'5 1 In most cases, the second-parent can be merely added as an
additional parent, rather than substituted for an existing legal parent,
presuming the child only has one other legal parent. In this manner,
second-parent adoption resembles stepparent adoption to the degree that
conjugal or quasi-conjugal partners may assume corresponding parental
roles vis i vis the legal children of one adult."'
Even though issues of parental status do not directly implicate
marriage, the discussion of parental status for same-sex partners often
focuses on underlying tensions between bans on same-sex marriage and
support for same-sex or second-parent adoption.' 7 Essentially, this is a
concern over whether the state can support an individual's parental
interests apart from support for the underlying marital or quasi-marital
relationship, something with which both foes and supporters of same-sex
marriage have difficulty keeping separate.118 In a telling example of the
155. For example, Vermont's second-parent adoption statute provides that "[i]f a
family unit consists of a parent and the parent's partner, and adoption is in the best interest
of the child, the partner of a parent may adopt a child of the parent." VT. STAT. ANN. 15, §
1-102(b) (2002). California similarly permits domestic partners to adopt in the same
manner as stepparents. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (West 2002) ("A domestic partner, as
defined in Section 297, desiring to adopt a child of his or her domestic partner may for that
purpose file a[n adoption] petition . . . ."). The quasi-conjugal dimension of second-parent
adoption is evident in the seminal New York appellate case, In re Jacob, which interpreted
the state's adoption statute to permit an unmarried person "in a relationship" with another
unmarried person to adopt. 660 N.E.2d 397, 405-06 (N.Y. 1995). Although expanding the
adoption statute beyond technical marriage, the court's decision merely substitutes "two
adult lifetime partners" for a married couple. Id
156. See Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child,supra note
146, at 205 (noting that second-parent adoption is modeled on stepparent adoption). As in
traditional stepparent adoption, second-parent adoptions "permit the homosexual partner
of an adoptive or biological parent to adopt [the child] without terminating the existing
partner's rights." ABBY LYN BUSHLOW, NAT'L RES. CTR. FOR FOSTER CARE &
PERMANENCY PLANNING, INFORMATION PACKET: GAY AND LESBIAN SECOND PARENT
ADOPTIONS 2 (2004), available at http://www.hunter.cuny.edulsocwork/nrcfcpp/downloads/

information-packets/gaylesbian-second-parent-adoption.pdf. Second-parent adoption is
distinct from joint adoption, where same-sex couples seek to adopt children to whom
neitheradult has a legal or biological relationship and both partners together petition as coparents to adopt the child. Joint adoption is permitted in California, Colorado,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington, as well as some jurisdictions within
Minnesota, Nevada, and New Hampshire. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 154, at
1.
157. See generallyVanessa A. Lavely, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Reconcilng the InconsistenciesBetween Mariageand Adoption Cases,55 UCLA L. REV.
247 (2007) (highlighting inconsistent treatment of same-sex marriage and same-sex
adoption by state courts and arguing that state courts should reconcile these
inconsistencies).
158. This issue was the central focus of the recent Florida case Embry v. Ryan. 11 So.
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omnipresence of marriage, both proponents of and opponents to the
extension of parental claims to same-sex partners of parents ground their
claims in the degree to which their relationships approximate or differ
from traditional legal marriage and the resulting entitlement to parental
claims based on stepparent status or its equivalent. In one example,
actress Cynthia Nixon expressed her desire to marry her partner, in part,
to provide legal protection for the relationship that her partner, "the stayat-home mommy," had developed with Nixon's two children from a
previous relationship. 9 Similarly, opponents of same-sex marriage like
Liberty Counsel founder Mathew Staver argue, "You can't have three
parents [for a] child, or you create something like polygamy,"a conflating
multiple parentage with plural marriage. In the same vein, Elizabeth
Marquardt of the American Values Institute cautions that "slippage" in
the meaning of parenthood has been brought on by new developments in
the marriage debate and expanding conceptions of marriage."' These
statements illustrate that the spectre of a traditional marriage norm, in
addition to its centrality in the legal analysis pertaining to parental status
and rights, haunts the surrounding discourse concerning the degree to
which parental claims and the legitimacy of same-sex romantic
relationships are invariably linked. The deeply intertwined discourse of
both marriage and parenthood means that resistance to revision of one
norm is invariably, if not inappropriately, accompanied by resistance to
revision of the other.

3d 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). Lara Embry and Kimberly Ryan were living together in
the state of Washington and were engaged in a romantic relationship. Id at 409. In 2000,
Ryan gave birth to a child, whom Embry adopted through second-parent adoption
procedure available in Washington State. See id. The couple moved to Florida and ended
their relationship in 2004, at which point they entered into a child custody, visitation and
property settlement agreement. Id. In October 2007, when Ryan refused to allow Embry
to continue visits with Embry's adopted daughter, Embry petitioned the court for a
declaration of her parental status as well as her right to contact. Id. The trial court ruled
that Florida was not required to give full faith and credit to the Washington adoption
decree, since same-sex couple adoption is contrary to Florida public policy. Id In doing so,
the trial court nonetheless cast parenthood as inseparablefrom the underlying romantic
relationshi. The Florida Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's ruling and upheld
Embry's parental status. Id. at 410.
159. Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast Nov. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PtRFerTqGww.
160. Drew Zahn, Lesbian Monmmies, Why Not Wives?, WORLDNETDAILY, May 16,
2009, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/?pageld=98267.
161. Elizabeth Marquardt, How Redefining Marriage Redefines Parenthood, Talk at
the lona Institute 14-17 (Jan. 30, 2008) (noting the alleged impact of polyamory and
at
available
of
parentage),
on
expansions
polygamy
www.ionainstitute.ie/pdfs/Marquardttalk.pdf.
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C Claimantsto ParentalStatus through AssistedReproductive
Technology

As with stepparents and partners of same-sex parents, acquiring
parental status in the context of ART is made more challenging by the
degree to which this model of family creation is measured against a
heterosexual marital norm. At the same time, the complicated web of
interrelatedness that links individuals participating in ART makes the
ascription of parental claims in this context far more complex than in the
case of stepparents or same-sex partners with existing children. ART has
the potential to create the greatest number of persons with possible
parental claims, including genetic donors of eggs and sperm, gestational
surrogates, and intended parents, as well as the marital or quasi-marital
partners of one or more of these individualsl62-at the very least, a total of
three individuals with some arguably reasonabable claim to parental
status.
Although ART is increasingly popular,' 3 the legal landscape regarding
the parentage of children conceived through ART remains an incredibly
varied patchwork of statutes and rules, many of which intersect with
disciplines as diverse as criminal and contract law. 4 The number of
individuals involved in the process of ART can also complicate the
resulting legal disputes over parental claims to and obligations for children
born through these procedures, especially where the law is silent or
162. ART can include a variety of interventions distinct from heterosexual mating
through intercourse, such as artificial insemination, where semen is introduced into the
vagina through a means other than intercourse; traditional surrogacy, in which a surrogate's
own egg is fertilized with a sperm donor; gestational surrogacy, where eggs are extracted
from the intended mother or egg donor and mixed with sperm from the intended father or
sperm donor in vitro and implanted into the surrogate; and in vitro fertilization, in which a
fertilized egg is implanted into the mother's womb. A broad definition might include "all
treatments or procedures which include the handling of human oocytes or embryos,
including in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, [or] zygote intrafallopian
transfer." 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7 (2006) (defining ART under federal law).
163. See SASWATI SUNDERAM, JEANI CHANG, LISA FLOWERS, ANIKET KULKARNI,
GLENDA SENTELLE, GARY JENG & MAURIZIO MACALUSO, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, ASSISTED REPRODUCIVE TECHNOLOGY SURVEILLANCE- UNITED STATES,

2006 1 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss5805.pdf. According to a
recent CDC report on Assisted Reproductive Technology, there were 41,343 live-birth
deliveries through ART in the U.S. in 2006. Id.
164. Approximately eleven states and the District of Columbia ban surrogacy
completely, and several of these states criminalize it. Human Rights Campaign, Surrogacy
Laws: State by State, http://www.hrc.org/issues/2486.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2010).
Michigan, for example, has very strict laws prohibiting surrogacy contracts that not only
hold these agreements unenforceable, but also impose fines (up to $50,000) and jail time
(up to five years) on anyone who enters into such a contract. See MICH. COMp. LAWS §§
722.851-861 (2009). Conversely, six states have explicitly approved surrogacy contracts
through their legislatures or common law, and the remaining states have yet to take a
position on the legality of surrogacy. Human Rights Campaign, Surrogacy Laws: State by
State, http://www.hrc.org/issues/2486.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
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prohibits certain ART practices. For example, couples who elect to pursue
surrogacy in states where it is not sanctioned may find their parental status
challenged by a traditional or gestational surrogate.165
For other prospective parents, imprecisions in the law pertaining to
ART collide with uncertainties pertaining to the legal status of same-sex
relationships, producing a nebulous set of parental interests to be
protected. 6 There is a significant overlap in the categories of persons
seeking parental status through same-sex parenting and parenting through
ART, as ART is the only means of bringing new children into already
existing relationships other than adoption. As described in the preceding
section, same-sex couples, whose legal status as a couple may not be
sanctioned in law, face unique obstacles when trying to gain parental
rights. 67 Rather than expanding the law to support the ways in which ART
facilitates family formation beyond the traditional dyad, "[c]ourts and
legislatures are straining to squeeze these technologically-formed families
into the traditional pattern.""6 Where abrogations of the traditional rules
for ascribing parental status in the context of ART have been upheld, it is
usually in the context of same-sex adults in a relationship resembling
marriage, or at the very least intimate partnerships that suggest something

"marriage-like."169
165. Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby with Few GroundRules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2009, at Al (describing uncertainty of surrogacy agreements in various states), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/us/13surrogacy.html?ref=stephaniesaul.
166. For example, the only law in Illinois on ART, aside from contract law, protects
only the parental interests of heterosexual married couples who participate in ART, leaving
undefined the scope of rights that other individuals participating in ART would enjoy. 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/2 (2010) ("Any child or children born as the result of heterologous
artificial insemination shall be considered at law in all respects the same as a naturally
conceived legitimate child of the husbandand wife so requesting and consenting to the use
of such technique.") (emphasis added). In addition, the Illinois statute provides for
parental status for husbands consenting to the procedure when performed by a licensed
physician, but not for unmarried or same-sex partners. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3(a) (2010).
Dorothy Roberts notes in her critique of ART and its conformity with, rather than
subversion of, the traditional nuclear family norm, "Laws regulating artificial insemination
contemplate use by a marriedwomanand recognition of her husbandas the child's father,
and recent state legislation requiring insurance coverage of IVF [in vitro fertilization]
procedures applies only when a wife's eggs are fertilized using her husband's sperm."
Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935, 936 (1996)
(emphasis added). See also Linda S. Anderson, Protecting Parent-ChildRelationships:
DeterminingParentalRights of Same-Sex ParentsDespite Varying Recognition of Thebr
Relationship,5 PIERCE L. REv. 1, 7-10 (2006) (discussing significance of marriage within

Uniform Parentage Act of 2002).
167. Supra Part IV(B).
168. Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Threat to the
TraditionalFamily,47 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 952 (1996).

169. This focus on intimate, 'marriage-like' partnership is reflected in the District of
Columbia's Domestic Partnership Judicial Determination of Parentage Act of 2009 which
supports parentage claims of domestic partners but specifically excludes from the list of
domestic partners a parent or grandparent of the biological mother. Domestic Partnership
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D. Conclusion

Married heterosexual couples, who bring children into the world
through heterosexual reproduction, continue to define the archetypal
parents. At the other end of the spectrum are adults whose function
appears wholly parental, but whose form-both as to quantity and
quality- violates our operative rules for ascribing parenthood. Recently,
courts have occasionally expanded beyond the traditional heterosexual
and dyadic model of parenthood in cases involving stepparents, same-sex
partners of parents, and individuals who consent to the creation of children
through ART. In each of these instances, the expansion has rested on an
underlying conjugal or quasi-conjugal relationship, thus privileging those
who can, or choose to, orient their relationships accordingly. Little
attention has been paid to other adult caregivers parenting children
outside of any marital bond, particularly kinship caregivers. Courts'
expanded definitions of parent thus fail to address the needs of
nonconjugal adult caregivers, particularly those who seek to complement,
not supplant, legal parents.
V.
ADAPTING 'HORIZONTAL' CLAIMS TO 'VERTICAL' PARENTAGE

Courts' expansion of parenthood beyond the marital or quasi-marital
dyad rests on rationales that can logically be, but have not yet been,
applied outside of the scope of marriage. Grafting these horizontal claims
onto a vertical parentage model requires thinking through how each
rationale can be successfully adapted to the context of kinship caregiving.
This grafting exercise is made more complex by the recognition that
ascribing parental status to kin would be best achieved by creating an
additive, rather than a substitutive,model of parenthood. In other words,
relative caregivers should be permitted to attain recognition as parents
alongside and together with legal parents, thus abrogating the "rule of
two."
Judicial Determination of Parentage Amendment Act of 2009, D.C. Law No. 18-33 §
4(a)(2), D.C. CODE § 7-201(4A)-(4B) (2008 & Supp. 2010). Courtney Joslin critiques what
she describes as "marriage-only ART rules," noting that the vast majority of states extend
parentage only to children born to heterosexual married couples. Courtney G. Joslin,
Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1184-86 (2010). She observes that only the District of Columbia and
New Mexico have removed gendered terminology, permitting same-sex couples to benefit
from the parentage presumption. Id. at 1187. Although true, only New Mexico's statute
removes the element of an intimate couple relationship, referencing instead a person who
"consents" to assisted reproduction. N.M. STAT. § 40-11A-703 (2004 & Supp. 2009) ("A
person who provides eggs, sperm or embryos for or consents to assisted reproduction as
provided in Section 7-704 [40-11A-704 NMSA 19781 of the New Mexico Uniform Parentage
Act with the intent to be the parent of a child is a parent of the resulting child."). Although
highly unlikely, such a person could presumably include a nonpartner, such as a relative.
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In the exceptionally few cases in which multiple parentage has been
formally recognized, courts have relied on the functional parent approach
and the "best interests of the child" standard to justify the extension of
parental rights beyond the "rule of two." Using these cases as a basis of
comparison, this section explores the way in which the rationales offered
by courts for expanding parenthood beyond the "rule of two" apply
equally to nonconjugal kinship caregivers. In addition, I propose an
expressive basis for extending parenthood to encompass vertically
arranged parenting claims such as those within kinship caregiving
families-a cultural framework that would give meaning to family law's
professed embrace of pluralist ideals.o70
A. The FunctionalParentApproach

Recent scholarship and case law on the expansion of parenthood
beyond the "rule of two" has notably relied on underlying functional
standards that "accord legal recognition to those who perform a family
relationship, regardless of the absence of formal or biological
connections."' 7 These "[f]unctional family claims [in which functional
parent claims are grounded] hold that those who function as a committed
interdependent

relationship

require-and

implicitly

deserve-legal

protections, regardless of their sex, or restrictive formal indicia of status
such as marriage, or ability to marry."172
Functional parent claims have been particularly effective in achieving
recognition of stepparents, same-sex partners of parents, and known and
involved donors in ART, whose claims can collectively be regarded as
"horizontally" aligned or radiating directly from a parallel relationship
with the legal and natural parent.7 1 Yet the functional theory is also
170. Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition:Pluralismin American FamilyLaw, 63
MD. L. REV. 540, 541 (observing that "a pluralistic approach to family law ... is based on a
commitment to inclusion and respect for difference, grounded in our political and
constitutional values of equality, nondiscrimination, and religious freedom"); Rosenbury,
supra note 117, at 208 (noting that family law has as one of its goals "to foster pluralism by
permitting individuals to explore diverse ways of living in our society").
171. See Appleton, Parentsby the Numbers, supra note 63, at 16-17.
172. Jenni Millbank, The Role of 'FunctionalFamily'inSame-Sex FamilyRecognition
Trends, 20 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 1, 1 (2008) [hereinafter Millbank, The Role of 'Functional
Familyl.
173. See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 399 (N.Y. 1995) (granting same-sex partner of
child's biological mother the right to adopt that child and noting that "[t]h[e] policy [of
construing adoption law in favor of the child's best interests] would certainly be advanced. .
. by allowing the two adults who actually function as a child's parents to become the child's
legal parents") (emphasis added); Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:
Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 464, 468-73 (1990); Sarah H. Ramsey,
ConstructingParenthoodfor Stepparents:Parentsby Estoppel andDe FactoParentsunder
the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J.
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particularly suited to vertical parentage claims, such as those that might be
asserted by kinship caregivers. In promoting an "understanding of
parentage as fundamentally a social, rather than a biological, construct,"174
the functional parent theory holds that those acting as a parent, and
understood by children to be such, should be accorded parental status
irrespective of the nature of the connection to the child.'7 1 Indeed,
"[f]unctional family claims rest on a performative aspect, that is, the
parties are granted rights because of what they do in relation to one
another, not because of the status of who they are or what manner of legal
formality they have undertaken."'76 The functional theory offers kin many
opportunities for recognition as parents coextensive with biological
parents, as there is nothing inherent in the theory that compels either a
fixed number of legal parents or specific relationship to a legal parent.
More importantly, because functional parent theory does not ground
parenting within a marital or quasi-marital relationship between caregiving
adults, it is more amenable to a broader model of parenthood.177 While in
many circumstances a nonparent's caregiving role derives from an intimate
relationship with a biological or legal parent, the functional parent theory
does not focus on the relatedness of the caregiving adults.
Several courts have applied the functional approach to extend parental
rights in cases involving conjugal caregivers. In 1993, for example, the
Supreme Court of Canada held that a lower court was not unreasonable in
defining "family" to include same-sex partners in a quasi-marital
relationship. 78 It found that the functional approach offered distinct
advantages over the formalistic nuclear family model precisely because the
latter "excludes all but a specific form of relationship." 79 In adopting the
functional theory, the court noted that the "objective yet flexible
[functional] standard ... allows for a more accurate recognition of a
greater number of family groupings," making it the most adaptive to
society's evolving understanding of family relationships and the reality of
families' lived experiences.'8
GENDER L. & POL'Y 285, 286 (2001).

174. Millbank, The Role of 'FunctionalFamily' supra note 172, at 8.
175. Id. at 1.
176. Jenni Millbank, The Limits of FunctionalFamily: Lesbian Mother Litigation in
the Era of the Eternal Biological Family, 22 INT'L J.L., POL'Y & FAM. 149, 150 (2008)
[hereinafter Millbank, The Limits ofFunctionalFamilyJ.
177. Millbank, The Role of FunctionalFamily,'supranote 172, at 1 ("The functional
family model . . . grows out of wider social and legal movements that afford recognition to a

broad range of nonnormative (nonnuclear, nonmarital) family structures. .. .").
178. Canada v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 T 135 (Can.). In doing so, the court
arguably laid the foundation for a lower Canadian court to pronounce fourteen years later
that a child could have three legal parents. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
179. Mossop, 1 S.C.R. 140.
180. Id.
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The persuasive power of the functional theory is further demonstrated
by a now famous Canadian case, A.A. v. B.B, in which the Ontario Court
of Appeals specifically held that a child could have three legal parents."'
In that case, A.A., the lesbian partner of the biological mother of D.D.,
applied to the court to be declared the legal parent of D.D.'" D.D. already
had two other legal parents, the biological father and the biological
mother." Although the lower court found that it lacked jurisdiction to
declare that D.D. had three legal parents,'"' it specifically noted the
performative aspects of A.A.'s parental claim, finding that "[the lesbian
partner] is fully committed to a parental role" and "has fulfilled the role of
a parent in every way imaginable."'8 The court of appeals reversed,
focusing primarily on the child's best interests as the basis of the court's
M
jurisdiction and the declaration of multiple parentage.'"
Similarly, in a 2007 case involving two lesbian mothers and a sperm
donor father, a Pennsylvania court applied a version of the functional
parent theory to hold that the biological, sperm donor father was estopped
from denying financial responsibility towards his children." The court
came to this conclusion even though such a finding meant that three
parents would be formally liable for support of the children for the first
time in a United States domestic relations decision. The court found that
the biological father was, in many respects, similarly situated to the lesbian
partner of the biological mother who bore responsibility for the children."*
In holding the biological father financially responsible, the court focused
on his parental involvement, which went "far beyond the merely
biological." M The biological father had "been involved in the children's
lives since their birth" and previously had paid substantial child support,
borrowed money to provide the mothers with a vehicle to facilitate
visitation, expressed an interest in relocating close to the children's home,

181. A.A. v. B.B., [2007] 220 O.A.C. 115 41 (Can.), rev'g [2003] 225 D.L.R. (4th) 371
(Can.) (issuing declaration granting parental rights to same-sex partner of child's biological
mother without revoking parental rights of child's biological father), available at
www.samesexmarriage.caldocs/abcO3OlO7.pdf.
182. A.A. v. B.B., [2007] 220 O.A.C. 115 1 (Can.).

183. Id. 1 2.
184. A.A. v. B.B., [2003] 225 D.L.R. (4th) 371, 38, 39,44 (Can.).
185. Id. 9J5, 8.
186. A.A. v. B.B., [2007] 220 O.A.C. 115 1 35-41 (Can.) (holding that legislative gap in
statutory scheme governing adoption permitted court to exercise its inherent parenspatriae
jurisdiction and that granting parental rights to A.A. in addition to child's other two parents
was in best interests of the child).
187. Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 475-76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
188. See id. at 480-81 (holding that, because biological father was involved in the care
of his children, he bore the same financial obligation toward them as the biological
mother's partner).
189. Id. at 481.
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and encouraged the children to call him "papa."" 0 In the face of resistance
to creating three legal parents each liable for support of the children, the
court found that the situation was not as untenable as the lower court had
concluded. Instead, the court pronounced that it was "not convinced that
the calculus of support arrangements cannot be reformulated, for instance,
applying to the guidelines amount set for [the partner's] fractional shares
to incorporate the contribution of another obligee."191

Despite its clear applicability to kinship caregiving, however, the
functional parent theory has failed to facilitate attribution of parental
status to relatives, even in states that have applied the theory to other
cases involving nonparents. Courts' resistance to applying the functional
theory in the context of petitions for parental status by relatives is evident
in In re Garrett.'" In that case, a New York state court expressed hostility
to a petition filed by a maternal uncle to adopt his nephew and join his
sister in a co-parenting relationship of the child. 93 While acknowledging
that "[i]t is undeniable that the area of adoption law has undergone a
significant transformation in recent years," the court summarily rejected
the uncle's petition without examination of the merits.194 The court
distinguished the uncle's petition from those filed by other nonparents
seeking parental status. It explained that those prior expansions of
parenthood by the court, which had involved members of same-sex or
unmarried heterosexual couples, were all "predicated on the rationale that
the relationship between the proposed adoptive parents is the functional
equivalent of the traditional husband-wife relationship, albeit between
same-sex couples or unmarried partners."195 The court thus conflated
parenthood and marriage without meaningful exploration of the degree to
which such conflation is appropriate or relevant to the best interests of the
child.
Although it is unclear the degree to which the maternal uncle had
actually assumed a caregiving or parental role in his nephew's life, In re
Garrettreveals how categories of caregiving adults can be excluded from
parental status. The court claimed that recognition of the parental claim
involved in In re Garrettwould expand parenthood "to virtually unlimited
boundaries," a statement likely meant to suggest, incorrectly, that there
190. Id. at 476.
191. Id. at 482.
192. In re Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
193. The petition for adoption was filed by both the biological mother and the
maternal uncle, who resided together. Id. at 414. The biological father in this case had
previously agreed in the divorce decree to relinquish all of his parental rights in exchange
for the ending of his future child support obligations and a favorable settlement of the past
due amount. Id. at 732.
19 4. Id.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
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are no logical rules that could be applied to vet parental claims.1? In doing
so, the court justified its conclusion by stating that the prior decisions
expanding the right to adopt or to assert parental status in New York state
were "simply inapplicable" to the case.'" Relatives, with or without merit,
are categorically excluded. The court's holding ultimately reflects the
narrow and marriage-centered terms of the debate over expansions of
parenthood.
Admittedly, the functional parent theory is not without criticism. As
Susan Appleton cautions, the theory of functional parenthood merits
additional development to shore up lingering "uncertainties, shortcomings,
and unarticulated assumptions that remain unaddressed," all of which
become particularly problematic when applied to the issue of multiple
parentage.1 9 Because functional parent claims are focused on the specific
performance of parenting conduct, their recognition imbues the
functioning caregiver with the privileges and obligations corresponding to
his or her role in the child's life. Several fundamental questions need
further refinement, including which functions are valued, when performed
by whom, and for what duration. Jenni Millbank raises an additional note
of concern regarding misuse of the functional theory on account of its
derivative nature, arguing that, "because it rests on the functions or roles
that members play in relationship to each other, [the functional theory] ...
grants only temporary status to nonbiological parents."19 A birth parent
may claim that, although the co-parent functioned as a parent in the past,
the absence of the co-parent following dissolution of the underlying
relationship means that they are no longer part of the functional
household. The birth parent may even prevent the co-parent from having
regular contact with the child. At that point, the functional co-parent will
cease to function as a parent. Courts have denied parental rights to coparents on these grounds in multiple instances. 200
196. Id.at 732-33.
197. Id.
198. Appleton, Parentsby the Numbers,supra note 63, at 15.
199. Millbank, The Limits ofFunctionalFamily,supranote 176, at 152.
200. See, e.g., Guardianship of Z.C.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(noting that trial court had found that although the plaintiff was entitled to status of de
facto and psychological parent during time she lived with legal parent, she subsequently lost
that status when the relationship terminated and she moved out of the home); V.C. v.
M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (noting that trial court had denied
lesbian plaintiff visitation rights on grounds that her in loco parentis relationship with
children at issue in the case "terminated once the relationship between the adults is
ended"). The trial court's decision in the VC v. MJB. case to deny the lesbian plaintiff
visitation rights to the children was reversed on appeal on the grounds that, given the close
bonds that had developed between the plaintiff and the child, denying visitation was not in
the best interests of the children. Id. Nonetheless, the trial court's decision to deny the
plaintiff any custodial rights was affirmed. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000). One
of the reasons the New Jersey Supreme Court cited for doing so was the long period of time
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Despite these shortcomings, the functional parent theory is flexible
enough to accommodate the wide array of modern family arrangements.
Because functional parent claims are focused on the specific performance
of parenting conduct, the recognition of these claims imbues the
functioning caregiver with the privileges and obligations that correspond
with her role in the child's life. At the same time, the recognition of
functional parent claims likely entails an examination of the specific
function(s) a parental candidate has assumed and may require the
disaggregation of the collective bundle of parental rights. Although the
practice of disaggregating rights has been widely critiqued, the parenting
plans used in many states to resolve child custody disputes frequently
distinguish between various, potentially severable "incidents of
parenthood" when allocating rights and responsibilities. 20 1 One parent
might be allocated responsibility for the day-to-day care of the child, while
another is given responsibility for making decisions about the child's
education. Such disaggregation not only better reflects the reality of the
caregiving relationships, it enables families to preserve all relevant
parental relationships. 202 More importantly, in reference to kinship
caregivers as parents, disaggregation allows for the distribution of parental
claims across a greater number of persons without respect to the
underlying nature of the relationship between the adult caregivers.
B. In the Best Interests of the Child

A child's best interests are the paramount concern in almost every
decision concerning the care, custody, and control of children. 20 The best
in which the plaintiff had not been involved in decision-making for the children, given the
termination of her relationship with the legal parent. 748 A.2d at 555 (arguing that because
the plaintiff "has not been involved in the decision-making for the twins for nearly four
years ... [t]o interject her into the decisional realm at this point would be unnecessarily
disruptive for all involved"). Thus, despite acknowledging that a "bonded relationship ...
that is parental in nature" had developed between the plaintiff and the children, the New
Jersey Supreme Court nonetheless found the dissolution of the relationship between the
two parents sufficient grounds to deny the plaintiff not only joint physical custody over the
children (which she did not demand) but joint legal custody for decision-making as well. Id.
See also Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 816 (Utah 2007) (holding that "legal parent ... by
removing her child from the relationship [may] thereby extinguish all parent-like rights and
responsibilities vested in the former surrogate parent").
201. Appleton, Parentsby the Numbers, supra note 63, at 23. Appleton also points out
that "almost every state has well-established rules for a division of the 'parenthood pie'
after dissolution of marriage, with courts routinely making separate decisions about the
child's legal custody ... and the child's physical custody." Id.
202. Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? DisaggregatingTraditionalParentalRights
and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 312-13
(2007).
203. Lynn Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundationsof the Best Interests of the Child
Standardin American Jurisprudence,10 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 337 (2008) ("The best interests
of the child doctrine is at once the most heralded, derided and relied upon standard in
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interests standard has been interpreted to refer "primarily [to children's]
best psychological interests (as opposed to other possibilities such as their
economic, educational, or medical interests)" or a set of factors relied
upon to derive an outcome that best promotes the child's overall welfare.'0
The range of factors that comprise the best interests standards used in the
U.S. have roots in psychological science, particularly developmental
psychology and psychiatry. 205 These factors are reflected in the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, which defines best interests to include the
wishes of the parent, wishes of the child, interaction and interrelationship
between child and parent, the child's adjustment to home and school, and
mental and physical health of all individuals involved."
However,
individual states may use other or additional factors to evaluate a child's
best interests. This variability has been criticized by practitioners and
scholars who regard the standard as both exceedingly broad and
frustratingly vague .207
Although no universal definition of best interests exists, courts
typically regard several factors as central to the concept, including: (1) the
attachment relationship between the caregiver and child, and (2) the
child's perspective or directly stated wishes about her best interests.2n As I
will explore below, while both of these dimensions of best interests have
been used primarily to support the claims of nonparent third parties within
the context of marriage or quasi-marriage, in principle neither of these
factors would exclude those outside of the scope of conjugality from
relying upon them to assert parental claims.

family law today.

. .

. The doctrine affects the placement and disposition of children in

divorce, custody, visitation, adoption, the death of a parent, illegitimacy proceedings, abuse
proceedings, neglect proceedings, crime, economics, and all forms of child protective
services.").
204. Robert E. Emery, Randy K. Otto & William T. O'Donohue, A Critical
Assessment of Child CustodyEvaluations,6 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INT. 1, 6 (2005).
205. Joan Kelly, The Best Interestsof the Child: A Conceptin Search of Meaning,35
FAM. Cr. REV. 377, 385 (1997) (highlighting benefit of best interests standard due to its
consideration of the individual child's developmental and psychological needs).
206. Emery, Otto & O'Donahue, supra note 204, at 6 (citing UNIF. MARRIAGE &
DIVORCE Acr §316, 9A U.L.A. (1979).
207. Katharine T. Bartlett, Preference, Presumption, Predisposition, and Common
Sense: From Traditional Custody Doctrines to the American Law Institute's Family
DissolutionProject, 36 FAM. L. Q. 11, 13 (2002) (noting that critiques of the best interests
test "focus on the indeterminacy of the rule, especially in closely contested cases in which. .
a clear standard is most necessary").
208. Kelly, supra note 205, at 379. Kelly notes that general guidelines for the
determination of best interests also include the parents' wishes; the relationship of the child
with his or her siblings, and other important figures; the child's adjustment to home, school,
and community; and the mental and physical health of all individuals concerned.
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1. Attachment Relationships

The best interests standard represents the law's attempt to take into
account the core factors psychiatrists and other researchers have found
necessary for a child's optimal growth and development." One of the
most important factors bearing on overall well-being, particularly for
young children, is healthy attachment relationships. 210 Indeed, the original
definition of permanence is "rooted in the psychology of attachment,
defin[ing] permanence as ... an enduring relationship that arises out of
feelings of belongingness" or connectedness to a caregiver. 211 The theory
of attachment, developed by British psychiatrist John Bowlby, is a
descriptive and explanatory framework for understanding interpersonal
relationships and the "lasting psychological connectedness between
humans." 212 Bowlby defines an attachment relationship as any relationship
between a child and an attachment figure as "any person perceived [by the
child] as stronger and better able to cope with the world and someone who
Attachment theory has obvious
provides protection and care.""
conceptual relevance in the child custody context and has contributed
significantly to the conceptualization of child custody evaluations.
Although the number of individuals with whom a child can develop
primary attachment relationships is not yet known, current research
suggests that children can have multiple attachments. In the past, some
theorists assumed that young infants have a single preferred attachment
figure, while others argued that children develop a hierarchy of attachment
relationships in which mothers occupy a primary role and all other
attachment figures occupy a secondary position. 214 Cross-cultural data,
however, provides little support for the existence of such a hierarchy.
Instead, multiple studies suggest that "the attachment network appears to
function in an integrated or interactive fashion, such that the combination
of multiple attachment relationships considerably increases the power to
predict children's later cognitive and emotional functioning."215
Researchers have suggested that alternative attachment figures can be
identified by "(a) [their] provision of physical and emotional care [for the
child], (b) the quality of care provided, (c) time spent with the child, (d)
209. See id. at 380-84 (describing how best interests standard incorporates
psychological concepts).
210. Id.at 380.
211. Testa, supranote 51, at 499.
212. JOHN BOWLBY, ATrACHMENT AND Loss 194 (1969).
213. Shelley A. Riggs, Is the Approximation Rule in the Child's Best Interests? A
Critiquefrom the PerspectiveofAttachment Theory, 43 FAM. Cr. REV. 481, 487 (2005).
214. Shelley A. Riggs, Response to Troxel v. Granville: The Implications of
Attachment Theory for JudicialDecisionsRegarding Custody and Third-Party Visitation,
41 FAM. Cr. REV. 39, 44 (2003) [hereinafter Riggs, Response to Troxel v. Granville].
215. Id.
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continuity or consistency in a child's life, and (e) [their] emotional
investment in the child." 216
As Shelley Riggs has noted, "these
theoretically and empirically grounded criteria for identifying attachment
figures are utterly blind to gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, and
even biological relatedness." 27 For children, an attachment figure exists by
virtue of conduct, not labels. Indeed, Riggs points out that all that matters
to a child is "the presence of a sensitive, loving caregiver, who provides
him or her with a sense of security, stability, and physical and
psychological well-being" -not that caregiver's genetic heritage.218
In two recent cases, courts relied on attachment as the basis for
upholding the creation of three legal parents. In A.A. v B.B, the Court of
Appeals for Ontario was persuaded that the lesbian partner of the
biological mother had developed a sufficiently close relationship to the
child to warrant a declaration of parentage, 219 even though such a
declaration abrogated the "rule of two." As noted above, although the
nature of the underlying adult relationship formed the backdrop against
which parental rights were assessed, the decision principally focused on the
best interests of the child. 220 Ultimately, the court held that it was contrary
to the child's best interests for him to be deprived of legal recognition of
his enduring attachment relationship with one of his mothers. 221
The strength of the attachment relationship between caregiver and
child was also persuasive in breaking open the "rule of two" in a 2008
family court decision in Great Britain. 222 In In re A, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's decision to recognize the parental status of the
estranged husband of the child's biological mother because of the strong
attachment relationship it found existed between the estranged husband
and the child.223 In supporting the preservation of an established parentchild relationship, even in the context of two legal and biological parents,
the court found that the "parental responsibility order was necessary in
order to secure the position of [the functional father] as well as to recognize
the nature of his beneficial influence and relationship as a social and
psychological parent to [the child]."224
216. Id. at 43.

217. Id.
218. Id.at 45.

41 (Can.),
219. See A.A. v. B.B., [2007] 220 O.A.C. 115
www.samesexmarriage.ca/docs/abcO3OlO7.pdf.
220. Id.at 1 39.
221. Id.
222. In re A [2008] EWCA Civ. 867, 2008 WL 2872488 (Fam. U.K.).

available at

223. Id. 165.

224. Id. 84. The court clarified that the functional father is not a father or parent,
explaining, "He is not a father by biological paternity or adoption, nor a stepfather by
marriage. He is a person entitled, by reason of the role he has played and should continue to
play in [the child's] life, to an order conferring parental responsibility upon him. He is thus a
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The psychological theory of attachment thus provides strong support
for expanding the definition of "parent" to include caregivers outside the
Attachment theory explains how
traditional conjugal context.
relationships to nonparent caregivers can complement-or, in some cases,
supplant -relationships with biological parents. Like the functional
theory, attachment theory does not presuppose that caregiving adults have
a marital or quasi-marital relationship to each other. A caregiver's marital
status impacts the formation of an attachment relationship between the
caregiver and the child only to the extent that it allows, or precludes,
access to the child. While marriage might create a favorable setting in
which bonding can occur on a daily basis, alternative attachment figures
can, and do, develop similar relationships with children outside of any
marital tie. The capacity for strong attachment relationships to develop
outside of a marital context is particularly evident when nonparents rear
children for substantial lengths of time, as occurs in most kinship
households. Kinship caregiving fulfills children's need for permanency
because it is often a "lasting" relationship, even in the absence of enduring
legal obligations. 225 Given the increasing phenomenon of relatives as
primary caregivers and custodians of relative minors, it is particularly
important to acknowledge the benefits of these attachment relationships, 226
especially for those who are not raised exclusively by biological parents,
and to model the legal relationships between caregiver and child on these
relationships.
2. The Child'sPerspective

The child's perspective provides a similarly persuasive basis for
extending parental status to those individuals whom the child regards as
parents. A theory of parenthood that meaningfully considers the child's
perspective would likely not be concerned with attributes of the adult
caregivers-such as gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, biological
relatedness, or marriage -that do not impact the caregiving relationship.
Several courts have recognized that a child's understanding of who
their caregivers are can be a persuasive justification for abrogating
person who, jointly with the mother, enjoys the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and
authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to that child (see s.3 (1) of the
ChildrenAct 1989) but he does not thereby become the father of that child." Id 96.
225. Testa, supra note 51, at 499-534. See also, Robert S. Marvin, Quality of
PermanenceLasting or Binding: LegalStatus v. Relationships,12 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & LAW
535, 536-37 (2005) (noting that Testa's "'gift relationship' theory is, at a formal level,
intriguingly parallel to the ethological and sociobiological theories that provided John
Bowlby ... much of the basis for attachment theory.")

226. Riggs, Response to Troxel v. Granville, supranote 214, at 48-49 (arguing that it
is important to consider the role those attachment relationships play in the promotion of
healthy psychological development and resiliency in children).
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traditional parentage norms. The British Court of Appeals' opinion in In
re A focused heavily on the subject child's perspective. In granting
parental rights to a third adult, the Court found the benefit the child
gained from the positive, loving, and supportive relationship the child had
developed with the petitioner was more important than the legal mother's
vehement resistance to the functional father's claim.227 Similarly, although
the Ontario Court of Appeals found that the child in A.A. v. B.B. was too
young to provide direct input, the court considered the child's perspective
to be sufficiently important that it used a statement by another child in a
previous case to represent the child's view. 2 2 The court quoted from the
affidavit of a similarly situated twelve year-old child in an earlier case in
which the child's biological mother's lesbian partner had sought
recognition of her parental rights. 229 The affidavit made clear how
important the recognition of the partner's parental status could be "from
the child'spoint of view":
I just want both my moms recognized as my moms. Most of my
friends have not had to think about things like this-they take for
granted that their parents are legally recognized as their parents. I
would like my family recognized the same way as any other family,
not treated differently because both my parents are women.
It would help if the government and the law recognized that I have
two moms. It would help more people to understand. It would
make my life easier. I want my family to be accepted and included,
just like everybody else's family.2 30
Such sentiments are surprisingly similar to those expressed by children
residing in kinship caregiving families. Although relatively few studies
have captured children's perspectives directly, those that have suggest that
children frequently normalize these caregiving arrangements and often
regard relative caregivers as parents. One small-scale study that examined
the perspectives of children residing in kinship caregiving families found
that "[m]ore children than not said that living with a caregiver is 'just the
same' as living with a parent."2 31 In fact, some of the children surveyed
227. In re A [2008] EWCA Civ. 867, 2008 WL 2872488, at 97 (Fam. U.K.) (stating
that mother was not justified in seeking to "ignore or belittle Mr A's role as the father
figure in [the child's] life, which the judgment and order of the [lower court] rightly require
her to recognize without erosion or denigration in the eyes of [the child] who enjoys and
derives such benefit from it").
15 (Can.), available at
228. A.A. v. B.B., [2007] 220 O.A.C. 115
www.samesexmarriage.cadocs/abcO3OlO7.pdf.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Jill T. Messing, From the Child'sPerspective: A QualtativeAnalysis of Kinship
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appeared not to understand the difference between the terms "relative"
and "parent." When the facilitator of the discussion group for children
told them that she did not know what it was like to live with a relative, one
child raised her hand and asked if the facilitator had ever lived with her
parents. According to the researcher, "[t]here was a moment of confusion
until the facilitator realized that this child was saying that the facilitator
had also lived with relatives while growing up-her parents!"232 Although
in subsequent groups, researchers were more careful to distinguish
between these living arrangements, the anecdote reveals the extent to
which children in these households conceive of "living with a relative" and
"living with parents" to be one and the same.233
As explored above, courts have used attachment theory and the child's
perspective to grant parental rights to adults outside of a traditional dyad
within the scope of conjugality. These rationales are equally well-suited to
support the claims of nonparents, like kinship caregivers, outside of
conjugal relationships. A further benefit of these approaches is that
neither concept limits the number of parents nor requires a specific
relationship between parents. Indeed, both concepts place the child at the
center of the discourse on parentage and regard as largely irrelevant the
nature of the relationship between the caregiving adults seeking parental
status.
C Emic versus Etic Perspectiveson "Parenthood"- Why Culture
Matters
Family law professes to embrace a pluralistic concept of the family. 234
This belief is reflected, in part, in the use of flexible norms like the
functional parent theory and the best interests of the child standard, rather
than proscriptive descriptions of family composition and structure, to
While pluralistic norms might underlie
determine parental rights.
expansions in the domain of parenthood and parental rights, such
expansions remain limited to the context of conjugality or quasiconjugality -some adult pairing in which the parties resemble, to varying
degrees, a married couple. The marriage-centeredness of the parenthood
debate undermines this pluralistic ideal. In order to better embrace this
ideal, courts should adopt an emic perspective on parenthood, which
would judge parental claims based on the internal norms of a community.
CarePlacements,28 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 1415, 1428 (2006).
232. Id.at 1417.
233. Id.at 1418.
234. Rosenbury, supra note 117, at 208. See also, e.g., Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) ("Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the
bonds uniting the members of the nuclearfamily. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins,
and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots
equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.").
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Such an emic perspective ultimately argues for the extension of parental
rights to nonconjugal kinship caregivers, especially in communities in
which such family formation and functioning is the norm.
As discussed previously, the marriage-centeredness of the parenthood
debate reveals the extent to which cultural norms influence the definition
of parenting and parenthood. Because "[p]arenthood as understood by
law ... is always a constructed or attributed status . . . which results from

prescriptive choices and normative imaginings about family life," it is
impossible for such choices about family not to be highly influenced by
culture."' As such, conceptions of parenting, parenthood, and the family
itself have an institutional and cultural history from which they cannot be
easily disaggregated. 3 6 These biases inevitably restrict what kinds of
families can be recognized, and thus prevent many from having "equal
opportunity to take advantage of the wider range of options"2 37 regarding
their own choices about family life.
Even as the composition of the American populace is rapidly
changing,"" law and policy continue to reflect only the values, beliefs, and
principles of Anglo-American culture and "the gap between the law and
the beliefs and practices of American [families]" only widens? 9 Simply
put, enthusiasm for innovation within the scope of "family," including
expansions of parentage and parenthood, continues to be selectively
expressed.24 0
This selective expression undermines family law's professed embrace
of familial pluralism and further supports concerns over pluralism's waning
influence in family law. 24 1 As noted earlier, cultural norms in black, as well
as other minority, communities recognize "care relationships [which]

235. Angela Campbell, Conceiving Parents Through Law, 21 INT'L J. L. POL'Y & FAM.
242,243-44(2007).
236. FINEMAN, supra note 81, at 112.
237. Perry, Race Matters,supra note 31, at 461.
238. "Minorities, now roughly one-third of the U.S. population, are expected to
become the majority in 2042, with the nation projected to be 54 percent nonwhite in 2050.
By 2023, minorities will comprise more than half of all children." Press Release, U.S.
Census Bureau News, An Older and More Diverse Nation by Midcentury (Aug. 14, 2008),
availableathttp://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/population/012496.
html.
239. Chiu, supra note 13, at 1796-97.
240. Amy L. Wax, Engines of Inequality: Class, Race and Family Structure,41 FAM.
L.Q. 567, 599 (2007).
241. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 90 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (expressing
concern for waning pluralism in family law and acknowledging varied household structure
and prevailing conditions that continue to shape contemporary American family life). See
also Rosenbury, supra note 117, at 200 (noting "how the boundaries of family law can
maintain hierarchies and inequality, even as the substance of family law attempts to
embrace a norm of equality").
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extend well beyond the sexual family as a matter of course."242
Anthropologist Carol Stack referred to the practice of caring for the child
of kin or close friends and corporately shared parental responsibilities and
rights as "childkeeping." 243 By vesting parental rights and responsibilities
for children in the community, rather than in the biological parents alone,
childkeeping reflects a multiple parentage model in which parental
responsibilities can be shared or transferred to others. 244 In sharp contrast
to the heterosexual, conjugal, dyadic model of parentage, parental rights in
these communities do not depend upon blood but are determined by a
variety of factors, including the length of time the relative has kept the
child and the conduct of the biological parent. 245 In light of this tradition,
the marriage-centeredness of the parentage debate reflects a cultural
hegemony in which only certain ordered pairs are valued and protected.
In doing so, it ignores the reality that, just as parenting and parentage are
cultural constructs, so too are the laws that govern each. 246
Courts should acknowledge the salience of culture in parenting and
parentage by adopting an emic, rather than an etic, perspective, on the
family. An emic perspective regards cultural institutions like the family
from the vantage point of someone within a particular culture. 247 In
contrast, an etic perspective views cultural institutions, like the family,
from the vantage point of one outside of that culture. 248 An emic, as
opposed to an etic, perspective on the family would conceive of family life
from the perspective of those within a particular culture or community.
Applying an emic perspective thus would make room for a more
diverse set of views on the family than those commonly acknowledged in
contemporary debates. An emic model of parenting would take these
norms into account in allocating parental rights and responsibilities.
Viewed from within a cultural and community context, kinship caregiving
relationships are not only beneficial, but increasingly normal.
Acknowledging this fact through the extension of legal parent status to
kinship caregivers would help move family law further toward its
242. Kessler, supra note 4, at 57.
243. STACK, supranote 38, at 62.
244. Id. at 63.
245. Id.at 62. As Stack observed, "There is no specific time period after which childkeeping becomes a permanent transfer of rights in the eyes of the community. The
intentions which the jural mother makes public, the frequency of her visits, the extent to
which she continues to provide for the child, and the extent to which she continues to
occupy all of the social positions of parenthood are all factors in sanctions over rights in
children." Id.at 88.
246. Chui, supra note 13, at 1793. See also id. at 1795 (observing how nuclear family
itself is a construct of Anglo-American culture and how minority cultures may differ in
their definition of family).
247. Id. at 1821.
248. Id.
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pluralistic ideal.
D. Conclusion

The rationales that have driven the creation of multiple parentage
arrangements can be used to extend parental status to kinship caregivers
through such an additive model of parenthood. Were the discourse on
expansions of parenthood not so marriage-focused, wouldn't we be asking
whether Carla, Amanda's father and Pam could together hold claims as
three legal parents? If functional parenthood, Shawn's best interests, and
a cultural history of intergenerational caregiving were the driving
rationale, would we find that Tina, her child's father, and her parents are
all deserving of recognition as co-parents?
VI
FROM CAREGIVERS TO PARENTS: How KINSHIP CAREGIVERS CAN
ACHIEVE PARENTAL STATUS

This article is limited to an exploration of the dynamics that shape how
relative caregivers may be conceived as legitimate co-parents and where
their claims to parental status fall relative to those of other nonparents
with conjugal or quasi-conjugal ties to biological parents. Nonetheless, it is
useful to examine briefly why other options, like traditional adoption and
guardianship, do not meet the needs of kinship caregivers. This section
presents a brief exploration of possible parental claims with varying
degrees of application to kinship caregiving families. For most kinship
caregivers, a multiple parentage model, such as de facto parenthood and
kinship adoption, would offer the best solution. Rather than divesting one
significant caregiver in order to make room for another or temporarily
vesting an individual with a limited schedule of rights and responsibilities,
such as through a guardianship, full multiple parentage would permit all
individuals involved in the care of the child to share an exclusive,
collective, and equal parental status.
A. TraditionalAdoption and Guardianshi

Both adoption and guardianship statutes have been utilized to provide
legal status, of varying degrees of permanence, to relative caregivers. Yet
neither traditional adoption nor guardianship are suitable for families with
ongoing relationships and a shared caregiving or co-parenting arrangement
in which biological parents will continue to play a meaningful role in the
lives of their children. Modern adoption law was "developed primarily to
provide permanent care to young children by persons formerly unknown
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to the child's family of birth," not care within extended families. 249
Similarly, traditional guardianship laws were developed primarily to
address cases in which the loss of parental care was due to the death of one
or both parents and was typically conceived as temporary in nature.
Permanent guardianship statutes typically require that at least one parent
be incapable or unwilling to provide adequate care to the child, and often
that the child be first adjudicated dependent.
B. De FactoParenthood

Both de facto parent status and parent-by-estoppel status are
particularly inclusive quasi-parental claims proposed by the American Law
Institute's Principles of Family Dissolution to support the claims of
nonparent caregivers.25 1 The term "de facto parent" is used to describe a
party who claims custody rights based on the party's relationship with a
nonbiological, nonadopted child. In a consensual de facto parent
relationship, "[t]he de facto parent has the status to assert his or her desire
to have a role in the child's life because the legal parent has effectively
already consented to that person's parental or quasi-parental role and
enlarged the family circle accordingly."25 2 In a nonconsensual de facto
249. Marianne Takas & Rebecca L. Hegar, The Case for Kinshi Adoption Laws, in
KINSHIP FOSTER CARE: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND RESEARCH, supranote 14, at 54, 59.
250. Permanent guardianships do not exist in all jurisdictions. Where they do exist,
such statutes typically require a guardian to substitute for an incompetent parent. For
example, in Arizona and Tennessee, permanent guardianship statutes exist providing for
the permanent care, custody, and control of children who are adjudicated dependent.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-871 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-801-807 (2010).
Permanent guardianships, in effect, create a multiple parentage arrangement by
transferring almost all of the rights and responsibilities of a parent to a third party
caregiver, irrespective of the relationship of the guardian to the biological parent. Some
permanent guardianship statutes, like that in Oregon, require that the court make a finding
that "[i]t is in the best interest of the [child] that the parent never have physical custody of
the [child] but that other parental rights and duties should not be terminated." OR. REV.
STAT. § 419B.365 (2009). While such limitations may be appropriate for parents who are
found to be neglectful and/or abusive towards their children, they are inappropriate in
those kinship caregiving cases where there are no allegations of abuse or harm, and where
continued parental involvement, including custody of children, is actually beneficial to
children.
251. See AM. LAW INSTIT., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(b)-(c) (2003) (extending parental rights to
four categories of individuals who are considered parents by estoppel, including individuals
who have "lived with the child since the child's birth, holding out and accepting full and
permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the
child's legal parent," and extending de facto parent status to adults who live with the child
and who regularly perform at least half of the caretaking functions with respect to the
child). It is worth noting that since they were published, the Principles have not been
formally adopted by any state. See ROBIN F. WILSON, RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY:
CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION 94, 123 (2006).

252. Appell, supranote 77, at 762.
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parent relationship, "any psychological parent [can] assert that the child's
interests include contact or custody with the psychological parents ...
regardless of the [biological] parent's consent to the formation of the
relationship."a 3
De facto parent status has been recognized through common law in a
few jurisdictions and enshrined in state law in one state. In July 2009,
Delaware became the first state to enact a de facto parent statute when it
amended its Uniform Parentage Act3? The amended statute was passed in
response to a 2001 Delaware court case in which the same-sex partner of
an adoptive parent sought recognition of his parental status. 255 Before
2009, the Delaware statute did not permit second-parent adoption.
Nevertheless, a Delaware court held that the same-sex partner had
standing to seek adoption, which the court found to be in the best interests
of the children. 25 6 In amending the Uniform Parentage Act in 2009, the
Delaware legislature "intended to continue the rights and responsibilities
of a de facto parent as set forth in" that case.25 7 To do so, the Delaware
legislature created a statutory definition of parent that appears to be
decoupled from a conjugal or quasi-conjugal adult relationship. Under the
statute, a de facto parent is defined as a person who the Family Court
determines:
(1) Has had the support and consent of the child's parent or
parents who fostered the formation and establishment of a parentlike relationship between the child and the de facto parent;
(2) Has exercised parental responsibility for the child ... ; and
(3) Has acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to
have established a bonded and dependent relationship with the
child that is parental in nature.25 8
While the model for de facto parent status here was derived from claims
arising within a quasi-conjugal relationship25 by its plain language, it is not
solely limited to cases in which a conjugality or quasi-conjugality nexus is

253. Id.
254. DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 8-201(a)(4), (b)(6), (c) (2009). available at
http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/lisl45.nsf/vwLegislation/SB+84/$filellegis.html?open
255. In re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179, 1182-83 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001).
256. Id. at 1185-86.
257. Delaware State General Assembly, An Act to Amend Title 13 of the Delaware
Code Relating to Parents, http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/lisl45.nsf/vwLegislation/SB+84/
$file/legis.html?open (last visited Dec. 3, 2010) (summarizing S. 145-84, 1st Sess. (Del. 2009)
(enacted)).
258. DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(1)-(3) (2009).
259. See In re Hart, 806 A.2d at 1182 (noting that petitioner, Burke Shiri, "lived
together in a committed relationship" with Gene Hart, legal parent of the two children
Shiri sought to adopt, "since the summer of 1979").
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present. Similarly important to the claims of kinship caregivers, a de facto
parent statute such as that enacted in Delaware authorizes a multiple
parentage scheme, leaving open the possibility of three legal parents. 26
At present, the limited adoption of the de facto parent doctrine means
that this option is available to very few kinship caregivers, and so far of
limited utility. Moreover, there are limitations to a de facto parent
statutory scheme. De facto parental status may only receive limited
recognition outside of the state in which it is granted. At the same time,
where the status is created solely by common law, state courts adopt
varying interpretations that may frustrate the efforts of parental candidates
who are seeking to complement, not to supplant, the parenting efforts of a
legal parent."6 ' Nonetheless, de facto parental status holds tremendous
promise as an avenue for kinship caregivers seeking parental recognition. 262
C Kinshio Adoption

Multiple parentage arrangements also could be facilitated through
creation of a new legal category, "kinship adoption," which would permit
kinship caregivers to formalize their relationships without extinguishing
existing relationships between biological parents and their children.
Unlike traditional adoption, which is restricted by the "rule of two,"
kinship adoption would be an additive model that would distribute
parental status among any reasonable number of caregiving adults in a
manner that approximates their caregiving relationship towards the child.
Because it would not require termination of a biological parent's legal
rights in order to permit a kinship caregiver to assume formal parental
status, kinship adoption would avoid the "stigma, conflict and potential
loss entailed in termination of all parental rights" associated with
260. Polikoff, A Mother ShouldNot Have to Adopt Her Own Child,supra note 146, at

224-25.
261. See Dorothy R. Fait, Jillian L. DiLaura & Michelle M. Botek, Who is a Parent?
42 MD. B.J. 4, 7 (2009) (noting that, in Maryland, even when de facto parent status is
accepted, de facto parent must still establish that legal parent is either unfit or that
exceptional circumstances exist to place both parents on equal legal footing).
262. Of slightly less utility is the parent-by-estoppel doctrine, which applies to
individuals with a good faith belief in their status as legal parent. This status would
typically be available to men who mistakenly believe they are biological fathers, but can be
adapted to fit the claims of some kinship caregivers provided they meet the relevant
criteria. By definition, the status is available to individuals who,
lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting full and
permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with the child's
parent (or if there are two legal parents, both parents), when the court finds that
recognition as a parent is in the child's best interests.
AM. LAW INSTrr., supra note 251, at §2.03(1)(b)(iv). In many respects, parent-by-estoppel
is similar to the de facto parent doctrine, as both rely on the actions of the legal parent in
consenting to the involvement of the nonparent caregiver. However, the factual
circumstances that give rise to kinship caregiving are less likely to meet this definition.
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traditional adoption 63 A biological parent in such cases would retain
some residual rights, while a caregiver would be granted the protections,
privileges, and responsibilities that accompany parental status. Kinship
caregivers might prefer this model of co-parenting over other quasiparental claims that fail to provide both the broad assurances for
caregiving relatives and the underlying legitimacy that typically attaches to
"real" parenthood.
Of course, kinship adoption is not without its own challenges. The
most vexing challenge is how to define what is a "reasonable" number of
persons who may be vested with parental status. Domestic relations
provisions increasingly provide for "division of the 'parenthood pie"' along
many dimensions related to parental decision-making.2 6 In addition to
elements of access to and custody of the child, parental status might
include responsibility for decision-making as it relates to a child's medical,
educational, or spiritual upbringing, all of which can be divided, in some
measure, among a number of persons. Yet domestic relations judges have
long been vested with the responsibility of resolving disputes concerning
children's upbringing when unmarried or divorced parents disagree.
Similarly, the degree to which one parent's decision-making authority
might trump another is an additional area of possible disagreement. Such
disputes are likely to occur with greater frequency the greater the number
of "parents" involved. Courts also are well-prepared to address such
challenges, having already developed sufficiently effective rules and
practices for disaggregating and assigning parental responsibilities between
custodial and noncustodial parents.
D. Presumptionsfor Kinship Caregivers

For kinship caregivers who do not seek declarations of parentage, the
law could provide other avenues for protecting their parental interests.
One promising option would be statutory presumptions of parental status
that would "expand the definition of parent and, thus, the application of
the parental preference to anyone who has a parental relationship with the
child." 265 Such presumptions could be created by a statute providing
parental status to caregivers based on certain criteria, such as the quality of
the relationship with the relative minor and the length of time that the
adult has performed a primary caregiving role. As such, the "parental
presumption would not apply to a third party who had not functioned as a
parent toward the child but, nevertheless, sought custody as against a
natural parent."a Kinship caregivers with a presumption of parental
263.
264.
265.
266.

Takas & Hegar, supra note 249, at 62.
Appleton, ParentsBy Numbers, supra note 63, at 23.
Richards, supra note 12, at 760.
Id. at 735.
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status would, like biological or legal parents, enjoy a superior parental
privilege relative to other third parties. This privilege "would protect [the
child in their care] from being uprooted from a stable, loving relationship
with a third party who has been acting as a parent, simply because a
natural parent, who is not unfit, decides to claim [exclusive] custody." 67
Each person designated as parent through a presumption of parental
status,
would enjoy a rebuttable presumption that granting custody to
them would be in the best interest of the child. If more than one
person meets the definition of parent, the preference would not be
determinative, and the court would then award custody based on
the best interest of the child, as between the two or more
"

parents. "268

Such an expansion more appropriately shifts the focus from adults' rights

to children's interests. 269
VII.
CONCLUSION

Kinship caregiving, which may encompass a range of caregiving
practices from "othermothering" to shared co-parenting alongside
biological parent(s), is both an historical and growing phenonmenon.
Increasing rates of kinship caregiving, particularly within communities of
color, suggest that the practice of relative caregiving will affect an even
greater number of children in the decades to come. Although in many
respects kinship caregivers assume the very same parental caregiving roles
as other third-party nonparents, they currently have fewer options for
securing their parental status. They are forced to choose between entirely
267. Id. at 736.

268. Id.at 761 (emphasis added).
269. Some scholars, such as Nancy Polikoff, suggest an iteration of legal presumptions
for kinship caregivers called a "designated family relationship" registration system.
POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE, supra note 119, at 130. Such a
system would permit people who register to publicly declare that their relationship should
count as family, namely in the context of parent and child. Id. Since the law, at present,
now lists family members, including parents, as defined only by marriage, biology, or
adoption, there remain limited avenues for decision-makers to be made aware of the
participation and presence of kinship caregivers. Id. Criticism of parental presumptions for
kinship caregivers, as well as designated family relationship registration, suggests that
resistance derives from the complexity posed by including additional parties with rights,
which is consistent with criticism leveled against multiple parentage arrangements overall.
This arithmetically based rejection of the proposed model argues that the division of rights
and responsibilities as between two adults is sufficiently less complicated than as between
more than two to warrant adherence to the "rule of two." Although this argument is
relevant to the discussion at hand, it is beyond the scope of this piece, which is intended
primarily to ask the question of "why not" as it relates to the inclusion of kinship caregivers
among the growing population of persons the law comes to regard as eligible co-parents.
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replacing a biological parent through traditional adoption or settling for a
legally subordinate status of guardian. Their limited options are due
primarily to the marriage-centeredness that frames the debate over
expansions of parenthood. The central role assumed by marriage or
marriage proxies excludes those outside of the conjugal orbit, including
kin, who seek parental status. Indeed, to the degree that marriage creates,
protects, and privileges families-and inevitably defines parenthoodkinship caregiving families who depart from the marital norm continue to
suffer from marginalization, exclusion, and stigma. 270
The limited discourse on expansions of parenthood implicitly suggests
that parenthood in its most revered form-as a quest for personal
transcendence 271 - is limited only to parenthood through marriage, quasimarriage, prescribed mating, or assisted reproduction. Kinship caregivers,
who become parents through conduct and commitment, occupy only the
fringes of the debate. These families are at once invisible and threatening.
Their limited "voice" in the broader family values debate is hard to
reconcile with the central democratic ideal that "the function of value
formation must be served by families who are at liberty to make their own
important value choices." 27 2 For the many kinship caregiving families upon
whom the perceived values of the majority are imposed, such vaunted
liberty is simply illusory.

270. See FINEMAN, supra note 81, at 110 ("The legitimate family-the one entitled to
privacy and protection . . . was defined in the first instance through marriage.") (emphasis
added). Note that expansions of parenthood that include the claims of relatives as parents
are consistent with arguments raised by Fineman, Polikoff, and others advocating a
replacement of sexual and reproductive affiliation as the core ties defining family with a
focus instead on caretaking as the core connection.
271. Parenthood as a means of personal transcendence refers to the centrality of
parental identity in the context of family life. Family life "provides the primary means for
the achievement of social, legal, moral, political, and economic benefits and rights of each
individual in the family . .. [and] is a-critical way to enhance the authenticity of the self and
achieve full social citizenship." Scott Weber, Parenting,Family Life, and Well-Being
Among Sexual Minorities: Nursing Policy and Practice Implications, 29 ISSUES MENTAL
HEALTH NURSING 601, 613 (2008).
272. PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY
VALUES 11 (1997).
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